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AGAINST THE SURGICAL REQUIREMENT FOR CHANGE OF LEGAL SEX
Harper Jean Tobin *
"I'm just an average bloke that lives in the suburbs. I'm a family man. I
have a lovely loving wife who cares for me very much. We have two won-
derful children you know? . .. I get up and go to work five days a week.
We have a mortgage. We're no different to anyone else. "I
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INTRODUCTION
At least to the rest of the world, "Kevin" (a pseudonym) was not
always an average bloke. Kevin was born and raised female, a fact that
caused him agony throughout his life. At the age of thirty he discovered that
others like him-people who were born of one sex but felt they belonged to
another-could seek medical assistance to live in their authentic gender.
Over the next few years, Kevin began taking testosterone; underwent sur-
gery to remove his breasts and give his chest more masculine contours; and
had his female reproductive organs removed. These steps enabled Kevin to
live a normal and happy life as the man he had always felt himself to be:
He'd taken all of the available medical steps. He'd made all of the social
adjustments.... He had a male birth certificate, a male passport[,] etcet-
era, and everybody whose path he crossed regarded him as male, from the
people closest to him, such as his partner . . . our extended family, the
people he worked with[,] and anybody that passed him in the street .... 2
Those are the words of "Jennifer," the woman Kevin fell in love
with one year after he began living as a man, and whom he would later
marry. Jennifer learned on their second date that he was born female, but
decided it didn't matter. "I know what a man is," she would later say, "and I
know what a husband is, and I know what a father is; and he's all of those
things."3 After nearly three years together, Kevin and Jennifer decided to
get married. But because they knew of no one else in their situation, they
did not know whether their marriage would be legally valid. To resolve this
uncertainty, they wrote to the office of the Australian Attorney-General.
When they fmally received a response,
2 Four Corners: The Gender Puzzle (Australian Broadcasting Corporation July 25, 2005),
available at http://www.abc.net.au/4comers/content/2005/s 1422174.htm.
3 id
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[W]e were just devastated, shattered, like how on earth could we possibly
get this correspondence like this? How could we be treated as second-class
citizens, as people that don't even have rights. The correspondence basi-
cally straight out said that I could be locked up in [jail] for two years [for
marrying Jennifer]. 4
Jennifer recounted:
I felt very shocked when I read that. I was actually physically shaking
when I read it. The woman that wrote the letter, who was in quite a re-
sponsible position in the department answering matters of family law and
so on, just made no attempt to veil her personal bias.5
Despite the troubling letter, Kevin and Jennifer went ahead with
their wedding. No criminal charges resulted, but the Attorney-General chal-
lenged the validity of their marriage on the basis that Kevin was not a man
and could not be a husband. The ensuing legal battle traveled through Aus-
tralian courts for four years. Kevin would later describe this process as
"very[,] very stressful .... It was very, very difficult [coping with] the un-
known of what was going to happen. I mean we had an awful lot on the line
... in relation to our life."
6
Ultimately, Kevin and Jennifer prevailed, in a landmark ruling af-
firmed by the full Family Court of Australia in 2003.7 This ruling came as a
godsend to thousands of transsexual Australians and their loved ones-but
this result was far from inevitable. If Kevin and Jennifer had lived in almost
any part of Europe or North America, courts would probably have found
Kevin legally a female and therefore invalidated their marriage. Courts in
those jurisdictions would have found that Kevin had not, in fact, "taken all
of the available medical steps" to become male since (as the Family Court
noted), "[h]e has elected not to have further surgery involving the construc-
tion of a penis or testes."8 The court saw no reason that the law should re-
quire such surgery, since it "is complex and expensive, and has risks of
complications and failure." Other courts, however, have taken a different
view.
This Note will examine how various jurisdictions determine the le-
gal sex of transsexual persons, and in particular the prevalence of sex reas-
4 Cohen, supra note 1.
5 Four Corners, supra note 2.
6 Cohen, supra note 1.
7 Att'y Gen. v. "Kevin and Jennifer" (2003) 172 Fam. L.R. 300 (Austl.).
8 Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fam. L.R., 404, 473 (Austl.) available at
http://www.wallbanks.com/PDF/Re%20KevinChisholmDecision.pdf. For discussion of the
legal context and significance of Re Kevin, see Rachael Wallbanks, Re Kevin in Perspective,
9 DEAKIN L. REv. 461 (2004).
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signment surgery as a prerequisite for gender recognition.9 Part I will pro-
vide background on transsexualism and the development of an international
legal consensus on the mutability of sex.'0 Part II will discuss the prevailing
prerequisite of sex reassignment surgery. It will be argued that rather than
promoting certainty in the law, this requirement creates uncertainty. Neither
can appeals to medical science justify this requirement. Most importantly,
the requirement has no basis in the public interest, and attempts to justify it
in terms of public policy have little if any substance. Part III will argue that
the surgical requirement poses serious problems of fairness and human
rights. Part IV will discuss the history and effects of the United Kingdom's
Gender Recognition Act of 2004-which does not require surgery-and
consider it as a model for other jurisdictions.
I. BACKGROUND
Transsexualism is a little-understood subject, and its treatment in
law is not well known. Part I-A provides important background information
on transsexualism generally, and on sex reassignment surgery in particular.
Part I-B describes how various jurisdictions have defined the legal sex of
transsexual persons, and the developing international consensus in favor of
recognizing sex changes in some circumstances.
A. Transsexualism
1. What is Transsexualism?
The term transsexual "denote[s] individuals who desire[] to live (or
actually live[]) permanently in the social role of the opposite gender and
who want[] to undergo sex reassignment."'" The process of sex reassign-
ment typically involves some form of body modification, which may in-
clude hormone therapy (which produces remarkable changes in a wide vari-
ety of secondary sex characteristics), 2 mastectomy or breast reduction in
9 In this Note, "gender recognition" refers to legal recognition of an individual's gender
identity. Many attempt to distinguish "sex" as a biological category from "gender" as reflect-
ing social, behavioral and cultural features of masculinity and femininity. The terms are used
interchangeably here because the distinction reflects an assumed dichotomy between biology
and culture which this Note will challenge. See SUZANNE J. KESSLER & WENDY MCKENNA,
GENDER: AN ETHNOMETHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 7 (1978).
10 The continuing debate in some jurisdictions on whether to provide gender recognition
under any circumstances is beyond the scope of this Note.
11 PEGGY T. COHEN-KETTENIS & FRIEDEMANN PFAFFLN, TRANSGENDERISM AND
INTERSEXUALITY IN CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE : MAKING CHOICES 51 (Alan E. Kazdin
ed., 2003).
12 Effects of female-to-male hormone therapy include beard development, redistribution of
body fat, deepening of voice, and cessation of menses. See Jerilynn C. Prior & Stacy Elliott,
Hormonal Therapy of Gender Dysphoria: The Female-to-Male Transsexual, in CURRENT
[Vol. 38:393396
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the case of trans men, and sex reassignment surgery (SRS). 13 Every person
has a gender identity, and seeks to live in a gender role and achieve gender
attributions consistent with that identity. For transsexual people, that iden-
tity, and their desired role and attributions, differ from the gender attributed
at birth.' 4 Estimates of the prevalence of transsexualism vary widely, sug-
gesting a U.S. transsexual population anywhere from seven thousand to two
hundred thousand.15
According to the American Psychological Association (APA),
transsexual people suffer from Gender Identity Disorder. The APA defines
CONCEPTS IN TRANSGENDER IDENTITY 297, 297-313 (Dallas Denny ed., 1998) [hereinafter
CURRENT CONCEPTS]. Effects of male-to-female hormone therapy include breast develop-
ment, redistribution of body fat, diminution of body and facial hair growth, and cessation of
male-pattern balding. See Rosemary Basson & Jerilynn C. Prior, Hormonal Therapy of Gen-
der Dysphoria: The Male-to-Female Transsexual, in CURRENT CONCEPTS, supra, at 278-96.
13 In this Note, "SRS" refers specifically to genital reconstructive procedures and not to
other surgeries, e.g. mastectomy. See infra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
14 Popular understandings of transsexualism are often confused by the conflation of gender
identity with sexual orientation. In the past many doctors would only assist the gender transi-
tions of persons who professed heterosexuality in their authentic gender. Nowadays, it is
accepted that transsexual people have widely varying sexual orientations just as other people
do. See, e.g., Ira B. Pauly, Gender Identity and Sexual Orientation, in CURRENT CONCEPTS,
supra note 12, at 237-48; Holly Devor, Sexual-Orientation Identities, Attractions, and Prac-
tices of Female-to-Male Transsexuals, in CURRENT CONCEPTS, supra note 12, at 249-76. As
noted below, infra note 151, courts have been slow in recognizing this fact, and have implic-
itly or explicitly assumed that any person changing their sex must be heterosexual.
15 To date no reliable, scientific estimates exist. Clinical studies from Europe have sug-
gested transsexualism is quite rare, with estimates as low as one in thirty thousand for genetic
males, and even less for genetic females. ARLENE ISTAR LEV, TRANSGENDER EMERGENCE:
THERAPEUTIC GUIDELINES FOR WORKING WITH GENDER-VARIANT PEOPLE AND THEIR
FAMILIES 38 (summarizing studies); AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGICAL ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 579 (4th ed., text rev. 2000) (citing the one in
thirty thousand estimate). An estimate of around one trans woman for twelve thousand per-
sons born male is widely accepted in Britain. See Lynne Jones et al., Cross-Party Briefing on
the Gender Recognition Bill (Feb. 2004), http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/legal/cpbrf.pdf. These
studies necessarily represent a serious undercount, however, because they (1) are dated and
represent a period when transsexualism was more stigmatized and individuals were less
likely to seek treatment and transition; (2) count only those persons who have SRS; and (3)
only count patients of specialized gender clinics, excluding the growing number treated
through private practices. LEV, supra at 38-39; Lynn Conway, How Frequently Does Trans-
sexualism Occur?, Jan. 30, 2001), http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/TSprevalence.
html. According to more recent estimates, as many as one in one thousand people bom male
become women in the United States, id., and as many as one in 750 do in the United King-
dom. Donna Patricia Kelly, Estimation of the Prevalence of Transsexualism in the UK., Oct.
13,2001, http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/UK-TSprevalence.html. These "back of
the envelope" calculations, based on the numbers of SRS procedures performed by the most
well-known surgeons and extensive anecdotal evidence, are admittedly unscientific. Never-
theless, they indicate that the earlier studies, though still cited with some frequency, may
underestimate by an order of magnitude or more.
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Gender Identity Disorder as a "strong and persistent cross-gender identifica-
tion" that "is manifested by symptoms such as preoccupation with getting
rid of primary and secondary sex characteristics... or belief that he or she
was born the wrong sex."' 6 This diagnosis proves controversial, however,
since "transsexualism does not appear to be inherently associated with [any]
psychopathology,"' 7 and much of the distress and social dysfunction trans-
sexuals experience may result from societal prejudice. 8 Australia's Family
Court has called it "questionable whether this condition is properly de-
scribed as a disorder,"' 9 observing that "people who have longed for transi-
tion to the opposite sex may find it offensive to find the incompatibility
between their sense of self and the sex of their body being categorised as a
'disease' or a 'malfunction.'
20
While theories abound, no scientific consensus exists as to the cause
of transsexualism. 2' Generally, transsexual people are typical members of
their birth sex in terms of sexual anatomy and physiology, which accounts
for the initial popularity of psychological (and particularly psychoanalytic)
theories of the origin of transsexualism. Recent attention has focused on
studies suggesting that certain elements of brain anatomy in transsexual
women resemble other women more than non-transsexual men.22 Some
have seized upon this work as indicating an origin in either genes or prena-
tal hormones; in other words, that transsexualism is literally intersexuality
of the brain. So far, however, only tentative data support this "brain sex"
theory.23
16 AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, supra note 15, at 581.
17 COHEN-KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 11, at 152.
18 See, e.g., LEV, supra note 15, at 177-81 (surveying theories); KETTENIS & PFAFFLIN,
supra note 11, at 70-84.
19 Re Alex (2004) 180 Fam. L.R. 89, 1 2 (Austr.), available at http://www.familycourt.
gov.au/presence/resources/file/ebOO1848a4fb4f4/realex.pdf (holding hormone therapy is in
best interest oftrans adolescent).
20 Id. 197.
21 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 28. ("It remains the case that
there are no conclusive findings as to the cause of transsexualism .... ); accord Kantaras v.
Kantaras, No. 98-5375CA, at 269 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Feb. 21, 2003), http://www.transgenderlaw.
org/cases/kantarasopinion.pdf (citing expert testimony of Dr. Walter Bockting), rev'd, 884
So. 2d 155 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004).
22 See, e.g., Jing Ning Zhou et al., A Sex Difference in the Human Brain and its Relation to
Transsexualism, 387 NATURE 68 (1995); Frank P.M. Kruijver et al., Male-to-Female Trans-
sexuals Have Female Neuron Numbers in a Limbic Nucleus, 85 J. CLINICAL ENDOCRINOLOGY
& METABOLISM 2034 (2000).
23 See generally ANNE FAUSTO-STERLING, SEXING THE BODY: GENDER POLITICS AND THE
CONSTRUCTION OF SEXUALITY 115-45 (2000) (discussing methodological and conceptual
problems with research on sex and the brain).
[Vol. 38:393
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2. Sex Reassignment Surgery
For many trans people, SRS is essential to achieving peace of mind
and a successful life in their authentic gender; the alternative is constant
anxiety, social maladjustment, depression, and the danger of suicide.24 In
male-to-female sex reassignment surgery, surgeons use the skin of the penis
and scrotum to form labia and a vagina; nerve and erectile tissue from the
glans are relocated as a clitoris. 25 Female-to-male surgery involves one of
two basic approaches. In phalloplasty, surgeons form a phallus from skin
grafts, usually from the forearm. In metoidioplasty, the existing, testoster-
one-enlarged phallus is released from the clitoral hood. In both procedures
the urethra is sometimes lengthened using tissue from the inner labia, while
the outer labia are often brought together (as in typical male fetal develop-
ment) to form the scrotum. Metoidioplasty is a simpler procedure, resulting
in a smaller, but more erotically sensitive penis than with the more tradi-
tional phalloplasty.
When performed by highly skilled surgeons on average, healthy pa-
tients, the risks of SRS are low; however, reports on aesthetic results and
post-surgical sexual sensation vary widely. As with any major surgery, re-
covery can be lengthy and painful. Complications, though uncommon, may
occur. Possible complications for male-to-female SRS include:
minor infections, bleeding, a sloughing-off and loss of some of the grafted
skin. Most of these minor complications can easily be managed and will be
under control before the woman leaves the hospital .... The more serious
complications include major infection or bleeding, and damage to the
bladder, prostate or major nerves during the dissection to form the vagina.
24 See, e.g., Friedemann Pfdfflin & Astrid Junge, SEX REASSIGNMENT. THIRTY YEARS OF
INTERNATIONAL FOLLOW-UP STUDIES AFTER SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY: A
COMPREHENSIVE REVIEW, 1961-1991 (1992), http://www.symposion.com/ijt/pfaefflin/1000.
htm; Richard Green & D.T. Fleming, Transsexual Surgery Follow-up: Status in the 1990s, 7
ANN. REV. SEX RES. 163 (1990); see also Regina v. North West Lancashire Health Authority
(2000) 1 WLR 977 (C.A.) (Eng.) (holding SRS is necessary treatment for many transsexuals
and denial of public health funding for SRS is irrational); Jerry L. Dasti, Note, Advocating a
Broader Understanding of the Necessity of Sex-Reassignment Surgery Under Medicaid, 77
N.Y.U.L. REv. 1738, 1760-62 (2002) (collecting U.S. cases to similar effect).
25 Information in this section is based on the following sources: Lynn Conway, Vagino-
plasty: Male to Female Sex Reassignment Surgery, http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/
TS/SRS.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006); J. Joris Hage, Medical Requirements and Conse-
quences of Sex Reassignment Surgery, in COUNCIL OF EUROPE, TRANSSEXUALISM, MEDICINE
AND LAW 103-16 (1995); GIANNA E. ISRAEL & DONALD E. TARVER II, TRANSGENDER CARE:
RECOMMENDED GUIDELINES, PRACTICAL INFORMATION AND PERSONAL ACCOUNTS 81-95
(1997); DEAN KOTULA, THE PHALLUS PALACE: FEMALE TO MALE TRANSSEXUALS 193-201
(William E. Parker consulting ed., 2002); S.V. Perovic & M.L. Djordjevic, Metoidioplasty: A
Variant of Phalloplasty in Female Transsexuals, 92 BJU INTERNATIONAL 981 (2003);
Eugene A. Schrang, Male-to-Female Feminizing Genital Surgery, in CURRENT CONCEPTS,
supra note 12, at 315-34.
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These complications can be difficult to control and correct, may require
major extension of the hospital stay, and can lead to permanent uncorrect-
able damage.
26
Similar complications are possible with female-to-male surgeries, and it is
not uncommon that patients require follow-up or "revision" surgeries.
While the definition of transsexualism once focused heavily on the
psychological need for SRS,2 7 contemporary usage reflects the reality that
many individuals undergo a permanent gender transition without having
such surgery. Medical conditions such as AIDS, hepatitis C, or clotting dis-
orders prevent many individuals from undergoing SRS.28 Others simply
cannot afford these surgeries, which cost in the tens of thousands of dol-
lars.29 While coverage by public or private health insurance is increasingly
the norm in Europe; 30 in other countries, such as the United States, private
insurers almost universally deny coverage for SRS.3 1
For some, religion also prevents them obtaining reassignment sur-
gery. In a study of over five hundred Malaysian trans women, only nineteen
had had SRS; while some mentioned the difficulty of finding and affording
26 Lynn Conway, supra note 15; see also Chettawut Tulayaphanich, Recovery After Sex
Reassignment Surgery and Possible Complications (2005), at http://www.chet-
plasticsurgery.corn/Srsdpostop.html.
27 See, e.g., HARRY BENJAMIN, THE TRANSSEXUAL PHENOMENON 13-21 (1966); DAVID W.
MEYERS, THE HUMAN BODY AND THE LAW 219 (2d ed. 1990).
28 While HIV-positive status is itself no longer considered a bar to SRS, full-blown AIDS
impedes surgery. A. Neal Wilson, Sex Reassignment Surgery in HIV-positive Transsexuals, 3
INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM pts. 1, 2 (1999), available at http://www.symposion.com/ijtlhiv_
risk/wilson.htm.
29 See, e.g., Jill Pilgrim, David Martin & Will Binder, Far From the Finish Line: Trans-
sexualism and Athletic Competition, 13 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 495, 526
(2003) (citing 1995 survey data showing cost of male-to-female SRS at "$10,000 to $28,000
or more" and female-to-male procedures at "$20,000 to $60,000 or higher"); LISA MOTTET &
JOHN OHLE, NATIONAL GAY AND LESBIAN TASK FORCE, TRANSITIONING OUR SHELTERS: A
GUIDE TO MAKING HOMELESS SHELTERS SAFE FOR TRANSGENDER PEOPLE 12 (2003), available
at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/TransHomeless.pdf (citing a figure of up to
$70,000 for surgeries today). Compare this to the 2004 U.S. median household income of
$44,389. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY AND HEALTH INSURANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES: 2004, at 3 (2005).
30 See Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 3, 21 (2002) (noting public
funding for SRS in UK, Ireland and other European nations); see also Robyn Emerton, Nei-
ther Here Nor There: The Current Status of Transsexual and Other Transgender Persons
Under Hong Kong Law, 34 H. K. L. J. 245, 250 (2004) (describing public funding in Hong
Kong).
31 See, e.g., Kari E. Hong, Categorical Exclusions, Exploring Legal Responses to Health
Care Discrimination Against Transsexuals, 11 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 88 (2002) (discussing
such exclusions, their occasional use to deny a wide range of other health care to trans peo-
ple, and potential strategies for challenging them).
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a competent surgeon, "[r]eligion is the main factor that discouraged the
Muslim [trans woman]. 32 They and their families worried that they would
be unable to receive a proper Muslim burial; some also "believed that if
they had [SRS], their souls would float aimlessly after their death since their
bodies were no longer the same as what God had originally given them.,
33
While this concern is made particularly acute in Malaysia by a 1983 fatwa
against SRS by the Islamic Council of Rulers, 34 there is no reason to sup-
pose that it is unique to Malaysia.3 5 Similarly, the majority view in Ortho-
dox Judaism is that SRS violates scriptural prohibitions on deliberate castra-
tion and sterilization.36
Some find the results of available surgical techniques unsatisfactory
in light of the high cost, painful recovery, and risks of complications and
diminished sensation.37 Transsexual men in particular, owing to the less
advanced state of female-to-male SRS, undergo it much less frequently than
trans women.38 And still others-apparently a growing number 39-simply
do not feel such invasive surgery is necessary for a successful life in their
authentic gender.4 ° In everyday life, the only people who need know or be
32 TEH YIK KOON, THE MAK NYAHS: MALAYSIAN MALE TO FEMALE TRANSSEXUALS 66-67
(2002).
33 Id.; see also id. at 109-12 (discussing traditional Muslim views of transsexualism).
14 Id. at 46.
35 See id at 109-13 (discussing traditional Muslim views of transsexualism).
36 J. DAVID BLEICH, JUDAISM AND HEALING: HALAKHIC PERSPECTIVES 78 (1981); Charlie
Anders, Transformed Before God: Welcoming Transgendered Jews, TIKKUN, http://www.
tikkun.org/magazine/tik05O9/article.2005-08-10.3345465137 (last visited Jan. 2, 2007) (rec-
ognizing that most contemporary halachic authorities follow Bleich's position, but also not-
ing a contrary minority view). By contrast, Anders notes Reform and Conservative response
condoning SRS. Id.
37 See, e.g., Katherine Rachlin, Factors Which Influence Individual's Decisions When
Considering Female-To-Male Genital Reconstructive Surgery, 3 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM
pt. 3 (1999), http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijt990302.htm.
38 CLAUDINE GRIGGS, S/HE: CHANGING SEX AND CHANGING CLOTHES 81-86 (Joanne B.
Eicher ed., 1998) (noting the higher cost and less satisfactory outcomes of FTM "bottom"
surgeries).
39 Jason Cromwell, Fearful Others: Medico-Psychological Constructions of Female-to-
Male Transgenderism, in CURRENT CONCEPTS, supra note 12, at 135 ("More and more trans-
sexuals are coming forward who do not invest in their genitalia as signifiers of their wom-
anliness or manliness."); Richard Green, Conclusion to Transsexualism and Sex Reassign-
ment: Reflections at 25 Years, in CURRENT CONCEPTS, supra note 12, at 422 (noting the
"growing number of persons" seeking hormone therapy and/or mastectomy but not SRS).
40 GRIGGS, supra note 38, at 86 (noting that "the change in attributed gender in FTMs is
generally more effective" than in MTFs, i.e., trans men often "pass" more successfully as
men and therefore feel less need for surgery); MOTTET & OHLE, supra note 29; LEV, supra
note 15, at 34-35. Trans men may have more success with achieving proper gender attribu-
tions because male is the "default" gender in our culture, while female gender attributions
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concerned about whether a person has had SRS are his or her lover and his
or her doctor.41
B. Transsexuals and Legal Sex
1. Early Treatment in a Civil Law Jurisdiction
People have lived in a gender different from that apparent at birth in
innumerable cultures throughout history,42 and sex reassignment surgeries
date back as far as 193 1.43 In 1945, the Neuchdtel Cantonal Court in Swit-
zerland decided the first reported case of a transsexual person seeking legal
sex recognition.44 There, a transsexual woman who had undergone reas-
signment surgery approached the court seeking a name change and "to ob-
tain judicial recognition of his [sic] change of sex, which will permit him
[sic] to lead the normal life of a woman, with a woman's name and dressed
as a woman. '45 Medical experts stated that Ms. Leber's sex had not been-
and could not be truly be-changed, but that her gender identity was con-
genital and legal recognition as a woman would be in her best interest. 46 The
court opined that "[i]t is not only the body which determines the sex of an
require a relative absence of markers associated with maleness. KESSLER & MCKENNA, supra
note 9, at 145-50.
41 In everyday life, individuals attribute gender to one another without any certain knowl-
edge of one another's biological characteristics or subjective gender identity. These attribu-
tions are by far the most important aspect of gender in everyday life, while genitals are rarely
revealed or discussed in everyday social contexts. KESSLER & McKENNA, supra note 9, at 1-
3, 77.
42 See, e.g., LEv, supra note 15, at 57-67; Richard Green, Mythological, Historical, and
Cross-Cultural Aspects of Transsexualism, in CURRENT CONCEPTS, supra note 12, at 3-14;
and see generally LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS: MAKING HISTORY FROM JOAN
OF ARC TO DENNIS RODMAN (1996) (noting this practice historically in regions worldwide).
43 COHEN-KETrENiS & PFAFFLIN, supra note 11, at 160; F. Abraham, Genital Reassign-
ment on Two Male Transvestites, 2 INT. J. TRANSGENDERISM pt. 1 (1998), http://www.symp
osion.com/ijt/ijtc03O2.htm (reprinting the original 1931 medical report in English).
44 Requete de A.-L. Leber, 8 Recueil De Jugements Du Tribunal Cantonal De La Republi-
que Et Canton De Neuchatel 536 (1945), translated in EUGENE DE SAVITSCH,
HOMOSEXUALITY, TRANSVESTISM AND CHANGE OF SEX 96-107 (1958). One source refers to
an earlier Swiss case, with the same result but apparently without a written opinion, in 1931,
and states that at least a handful of individuals were granted recognition "by solitary deci-
sions of German registrars or local administrations" in the 1930s. COHEN-KETTENIS &
PFAFFLIN, supra note 11, at 160. Western legal systems have for centuries wrestled with the
not unrelated question of the status of intersex persons, that is, those born with ambiguous
sex characteristics. Id. at 155-57 (summarizing this history).
45 DE SAVITSCH, supra note 45, at 97.
46 See id. at 100.
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individual, it is also the mind.",47 The court therefore held that recognizing
the change of sex would benefit not only the individual but also "the inter-
ests of public order and morality." 8
2. The Doctrine of Immutability
Despite this favorable precedent, transsexuals frequently fared
worse in courts in the years to come, particularly in common law jurisdic-
tions. In the 1970 case of Corbett v. Corbett, an English court faced for the
first time the question of whether a man can become a woman.4 9 The case
concerned the validity of a marriage in which the wife-a top fashion model
until the tabloid press revealed her past5° was a post-operative transsexual
woman. Although cautioning that medical facts "do not necessarily decide
the legal basis of sex determination,"'" the court in fact relied heavily on
medical testimony. It cited agreement among the expert witnesses "that the
biological sexual constitution of an individual is fixed at birth (at the latest),
and cannot be changed, either by the natural development of organs of the
opposite sex, or by medical or surgical means. The respondent's operation,
therefore, cannot affect her true sex." 52 The court then opined that,
"[h]aving regard to the essentially hetero-sexual character of... marriage,
the criteria [for being a man or woman] must, in my judgment, be biologi-
cal." Moreover, it held that Mrs. Corbett could not be a wife because she
was not
naturally capable of performing the essential role of a woman in marriage.
In other words, the law should adopt in the first place... the chromosomal,
gonadal and genital tests, and if all three are congruent, determine the sex
for the purpose of marriage accordingly, and ignore any operative inter-
vention.53
47 Id. at 105. This has also been translated as, "it is also his soul." Michael R. Will, Legal
Conditions for Sex Reassignment by Medical Intervention: Situation in Comparative Law, in
TRANSSEXUALISM, MEDICINE AND LAW 91 (1995).
48 DE SAVITSCH, supra note 45, at 105.
49 See Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83 (U.K.).
50 Jane Warren, Forty Years After My Sex Change I'm Still Treated as a Joke, Though I
Don't Get My Face Slapped Any More, THE ExPREss, July 28, 2000, available at http://
www.pfc.org.uk/news/2000/aa-ex.htm.
51 Corbett, [1971] P. at 100.
52 Id. at 104. Accord Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] JKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467, 473
(U.K.) (Judgment of Lord Nicholls) ("The change of body can never be complete.").
" Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 106. Curiously, the court did not specify whether "the essential
role of a woman in marriage" was intercourse, childbirth, or something else.
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Over the years, courts in South Africa,54 Canada,55 Hong Kong,56
New Zealand,57 Ireland,58 Singapore, 59 and the United States60 have fol-
lowed the reasoning of Corbett.
Corbett's doctrine of immutability has had far-reaching and pemi-
cious effects for transsexual people and their families. Most centrally, the
law has barred transsexual persons from marrying members of the opposite
sex, or has voided their marriages after the fact. This can result in depriva-
tion of the right to inherit by intestacy, the right to sue for loss of consor-
tium or wrongful death, the right to spousal support in case of divorce, and
even the right to custody of their children. 6' Immigrants may be deported if
their marriage is invalidated.62 In some jurisdictions, liability for crimes of
sexual violence depends on the sex of the perpetrator or the victim.63 The
age of eligibility for public pension rights may dePend on sex.64 Require-
ments for military service may also depend on sex.65 Whether prisons cate-
54 W v. W 1976 (2) SA 308 (W.L.D.) (S. Aft.).
51 M v. M, [1984], 42 R.F.L. (2d) 55. (Can.).
56 Katherine O'Donovan, Sexual Freedom, in CIVIL LIBERTIES IN HONG KONG 302, 315
(Raymond Wacks ed., 1988) (Corbett followed by trial court); Emerton, Neither Here Nor
There, supra note 31 (Registrar still follows Corbett, and courts likely to continue to do so as
well).
" Re T, [1975] 2 N.Z.L.R. 449 (N.Z.).
58 Foy v. An t-Ard Chlaraitheoir & Ors, [2002] I.E.H.C. 116 (9th July 2002) (H. Ct.) (Ir.)
available at http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2002/116.html (last visited September 24,
2006).
59 Lim Ying v. Hiok Kian Ming Eric, [1992], 1 S.L.R. 184 (Sing.).
60 See In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987); Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.3d
223 (Tex. App. 1999).
61 See Alyson Dodi Meiselman, et al., Cause ofAction for Legal Change of Gender § 5, 24
Causes of Action No. 2 135 (2005) (citing cases).
62 See Dionesio Grava, Despite Adverse Ruling, Filipino Transsexual Says Fight is Not
Over, BALITA, Oct. 8, 2005, http://www.balita.com/_2005/100805/news04.
php (reporting threatened deportation of a trans woman's husband on the grounds they are
not married); Henry McDonald, Sex-Change Husband Fights Irish State Ban, GuARDIAN,
Oct. 17, 2004 (same); but see In re Lovo, 23 I&N Dec. 746 (BIA 2005) (rejecting this result).
63 See R. v. Tan, (1983) 2 All E. R. 12 (U.K.); R v Harris and McGuinness (1988) 17
N.S.W.L.R. 158 (Crim. App.).
64 See, e.g., Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. HH (1991) 23 A.L.D. 58 (Admin. App. Trib., Austl.);
Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.). This was a
major concern of legislators during the passage of the UK Gender Recognition Act, see, e.g.,
656 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) GC93-96, despite the fact that the pension age there
will gradually be equalized between 2010 and 2020. Pensions Act, 1995, c. 26, §126 (U.K.).
65 The position in the United States is somewhat unclear. The Selective Service System
itself states, "Individuals who are born female and have a sex change are not required to
register. U.S. citizens or immigrants who are born male and have a sex change are still re-
quired to register. In the event of a resumption of the draft, males who have had a sex change
can file a claim for an exemption from military service if they receive an order to report for
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gorize inmates as, and house them with, men or women can have serious
implications for their safety and wellbeing.66 Even the use of a public rest-
room may subject an individual to legal sanction.67 Beyond the direct legal
effects of sex, having legal documents (such as a birth certificate and
driver's license) which indicate a sex incongruent with identity and social
role leads to embarrassment and harassment for transsexual persons who
must regularly produce them for identification purposes.
3. The Trend Away From Immutability
Despite the wide influence of Corbett, conflict and uncertainty on
this issue continued. A long string of commentators, 68 and some courts, took
the view that Corbett was out of step with current medical knowledge and
that "[n]o relevant principle or policy is advanced" by refusing to recognize
change of sex.69 Only six years after Corbett, one American court ruled that
exclusive reliance on chromosomes for sex determination by professional
athletic associations is "grossly unfair, discriminatory and inequitable," and
examination or induction." Selective Service Administration, Frequently Asked Questions
(2005), at http://www.sss.gov/QA.HTM#quest35. But see Jamison Green, Visible Man:
Selective Service (2004), at http://www.planetout.com/people/columns/green/archive/2004
011 5.html ("If you are living as a male and listed as male with Social Security, the answer is
YES, you must register," which would include many post-operative trans men). As for trans
women, the Selective Service System appears not to have formulated standards for adjudging
their exemption claims, should the need arise.
66 See generally Rebecca Mann, The Treatment of Transgender Prisoners, Not Just An
American Problem, 15 L. & SEXUALITY 91 (2006) (discussing prisoner placement in three
countries and recommending that all trans prisoners who have not had SRS, regardless of
gender, be housed with women for safety reasons); Christine Peek, Breaking Out of the
Prison Hierarchy: Transgender Prisoners, Rape, and the Eighth Amendment, 44 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 1211 (2004) (discussing the pervasive abuse of trans women in male prisons).
67 See, e.g. Laura Hensley, Transgender Evacuee Arrested, BRYAN-COLLEGE STATION
EAGLE, Sept. 9, 2005, available at http://www.theeagle.com/stories/090905/local_2005
0909047.php; SAN FRANCISCO HUMAN RIGHTS COMMISSION, GENDER NEUTRAL BATHROOM
SURVEY (2001), available at http://www.transgenderlawcenter.org/pdf/sbacsurvey.pdf
(quoting transgender respondents' experiences and fears of being arrested or threatened with
arrest in public bathrooms); see also Lisa Mottet, Access to Gender-Appropriate Bathrooms:
A Frustrating Diversion on the Path to Transgender Equality, 4 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 739
(2003) (discussing bathroom access in the context of employment discrimination law); Croft
v. Royal Mail Group [2003] EWCA (Civ) 1045 (U.K.) (employer could refuse access to
gender-appropriate restroom for employee who had not had SRS).
68 See ANDREW N. SHARPE, TRANSGENDER JURISPRUDENCE: DYSPHORIC BODIES OF LAw 58
(2002) (citing works by two dozen commentators in various nations between 1970 and 1994
criticizing Corbett).
69 Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fam. L.R. 404, 420 (Austl.) Accord Att'y
Gen. v. Otahuhu Faro. Ct. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603, 607 ("There is no social advantage in the
law not recognizing the validity of the marriage of a transsexual in the sex of reassign-
ment.").
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in violation of New York's Human Rights Law.70 By the 1990s, the view
that sex is immutable had definitely lost favor.
Today, almost all U.S. states, as well as the District of Columbia
and Guam, recognize change of sex under some circumstances. 71 This posi-
tion is now generally accepted in common law jurisdictions,72 and by 1997
at least twenty-three of the thirty-seven Council of Europe member states
clearly permitted change of legal sex.73 Today, only seven jurisdictions in
all of Europe and North America now refuse to recognize change of sex
under any circumstance, 74 and recognition is quickly gaining ground in
other parts of the world.75 Japan adopted legislation in 2004 recognizing sex
changes;76 Singapore codified its long-standing policy of recognition in
70 Richards v. United States Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (1977).
71 See In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 83-84 n.8 (Md. 2003) (citing twenty two statutes "ex-
pressly enabling a person who has undergone a change in gender to have his or her birth
certificate amended to reflect the change," and noting the existence of twenty other statutes
dealing generally with birth certificate changes).
72 See Otahuhu, [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. at 603; Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status
Act 49 of 2003 (S. Africa); Integrating Transsexual and Transgendered People, Liberty
Amicus Curiae filed in Sheffield & Horsham v. United Kingdom, (1998) V Eur. Ct. H.R.
2014, available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/node/345 [hereinafter Liberty] (noting "full accep-
tance and change of documents" in Namibia). In Canada the case law is ambiguous but
seems to point toward post-operative recognition, see Shauna Labman, Left in Legal Limbo:
Transsexual Identity and the Law, 7 APPEAL 66 (2001). India stands out as an important
common law exception. See PEOPLE'S UNION FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES OF KARNATAKA, HUMAN
RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AGAINST THE TRANSGENDER COMMUNITY 50 (2003), available at
http://ai.eecs.umich.edu/people/conway/TS/PUCL/PUCL%20Report.html. India's failure to
embrace gender recognition is puzzling in light of its constitutional privacy guarantee and the
long-standing cultural visibility of gender-variant people there. While such empirical ques-
tions are beyond the scope of this Note, this author speculates that factors contributing to this
state of affairs may include the traditional dominance of religion in Indian family law, and
peculiarities of traditional gender-variant identities and communities in India. See generally
SERENA NANDA, NEITHER MAN NOR WOMAN: THE HuRAS OF INDIA (1990); RAJESH TALWAR,
THE THIRD SEX AND HUMAN RIGHTS 53-79 (1999).
73 Liberty, supra note 73.
74 Ohio, In re Ladrach, 513 N.E.2d 828 (Ohio Prob. 1987); Texas, Littleton v. Prange, 9
S.W 3d 223 (Tex. App. 1999), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 872 (2000); Tennessee, Tenn. Code
Ann. § 68-3-203 (2002); Kansas, In re Estate of Gardiner, 42 P.3d 120 (Kan. 2002); Florida,
Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155 (Fla.App. 2004); and in Europe, Andorra, Albania and
Ireland, Liberty, supra note 73; The Irish case of Foy v. Ant-Ard Chlaraitheoir, supra note
59, (currently on appeal to the Irish Supreme Court. DONNCHA O'CONNELL, REPORT ON THE
SITUATION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN IRELAND IN 2004 44 (2005), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/justicehome/cfrcdf/doc/rapport_2002_en.pdf.
75 Unfortunately, precious little information is available in English about gender recogni-
tion in African and Latin American jurisdictions.
76 Robyn Emerton, Time for Change: A Call for the Legal Recognition of Transsexual and
Other Transgender Persons in Hong Kong, 34 H.K.L.J. 515, 546-49 (2004).
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1996 after a contrary court ruling; 77 and South Korea's Supreme Court es-
tablished recognition in mid-2006.78 In Malaysia, legislation on gender rec-
ognition has been introduced following conflicting court rulings.79 Lower
courts in Kuwait80 and the Philippines 81 have recognized changes of sex, but
have been reversed on appeal. Recognition is available to transsexual citi-
zens in at least some regions of China.82 Even nations as dissimilar as Israel
and Iran-the latter known for its draconian treatment of gay and lesbian
people-appear to agree on the issue of gender recognition.83
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) and the Commission
beneath it have played a major role in the history of gender recognition.
Between 1980 and 2002, the ECHR and the Commission heard over a dozen
suits alleging that refusal to recognize gender transition violated the right to
private life and the right to marry under the European Convention on Fun-
damental Rights and Freedoms. In the first case, the Commission ruled
against Belgium, but the ECHR dismissed the case on procedural grounds.8 4
Cases against Germany and Italy were dropped when those countries passed
77 WOMEN'S CHARTER (AMENDMENT) ACT No. 30/96 (1961); see also Chan Wing Cheon,
Latest Improvements to the Women's Charter, SING. J. LEG. STUD. 553 (1996).
78 See, e.g., Kim Rahn, Transsexual Ruling to Bring Changes, KOREA TIMES, June 23,
2006, available at http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/nation/200606/kt2006062317573311990.
htm.
79 See also Jonathan Kent, Transsexual Debate in Malaysia, BBC NEWS, Nov. 5, 2005,
http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/3985059.stm; compare Wong Chiou
Yong v. Pendaftar Besar/Ketua Pengarah Jabatan Pendaflaran Negara, [2005] 1 MALAYAN L.
J. 551 (Malay.) (following Corbett) with J.G. v. Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara,
[2005] 366 MALAYAN L. J. I (Malay.) (granting declaratory relief for post-operative trans
woman).
80 Kuwait Sex-Change Case Upheld, BBC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/middle east/3657727.stm; Nirmala Janssen, Defiant Kuwaiti Transsexual Determined to
Fight It Out, GULFNEWS.COM, Oct. 17, 2004, http://archive.gulfnews.com/articles/04/10/17/
136062.html. While the latter article mentions a planned appeal to Kuwait's Court of Cass-
ation, nothing further has been reported on this case in the English-language media.
81 Emerton, Time for Change, supra note 78, at 517 n. 10 (citing one trial court case and
alluding to others); Denise Brogan, TS in the PI, MUSINGS ON LIFE, LAW AND GENDER, Mar.
5, 2006, http://musingsonlifelawandgender.typepad.com/life-lawgender/2006/03/ts-in-the
pi.html (excerpting a Philippine news report of Court of Appeals reversal in case cited by
Emerton).
82 Emerton, Neither Here Nor There, supra note 31, at 247 n. 15 (citing several news re-
ports).
83 Merav Sarig, A transgender agenda, HAARETZ.COM, June 5, 2003, http://www.haaretz.
com/hasen/pages/ShArt.jhtml?itemNo=290851 (Israel); Nazila Fathi, As Repression Lifts,
More Iranians Change Sexes, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 2, 2004, at A3; Caroline Mangez, Iran's
Transsexual Revolution, INDEPENDENT UK, July 13, 2005, available at http://www.truthout.
org/issues 05/111405WB.shtml. It is unclear whether the latest wave of religious conserva-
tism in Iran has slowed or reversed this trend.
84 Van Oosterwijck v. Belgium, 40 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1980).
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gender recognition laws.85 A series of cases against the United Kingdom
began in 1986.86 While the Court declined to rule against the U.K., it
showed increasing impatience with the government's persistent failure to
review the issue. In a 1992 suit against France, the Court gave its first clear
ruling that the Convention mandates gender recognition.87 In two subse-
quent cases the Court maintained that the gender recognition issue fell
within the U.K.'s "margin of appreciation. 88 Finally, in 2002 the Court
held unanimously against the U.K. In the case of Goodwin v. United King-
dom, it declared that "since there are no significant factors of public interest
to weigh against the interest of [the] individual applicant in obtaining legal
recognition of her gender re-assignment," their rights under the Convention
had been violated.89
As the ECHR recognized in Goodwin, there is now "a continuing
international trend towards legal recognition." 90 But while there is now a
consensus that "a system for recognising transsexual people in their
acquired gender must exist,"91 there is no such consensus as to what that
system should look like.92 In particular, the crucial question of the substan-
tive criteria for recognition remains.
II. DRAWING THE LINE: THE SURGICAL REQUIREMENT
FOR GENDER RECOGNITION
Kevin and Jennifer's marriage was challenged on the grounds that it
was a same-sex marriage. Applying such a label merely begs the question of
how an individual's sex is defined. By adopting gender recognition for post-
operative individuals, states have effectively decided that sex is not defined
by chromosomes, social or anatomical history, or reproductive capacity.
85 Will, supra note 48, at 78.
86 Rees v. United Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986); see also Cossey v. United
Kingdom, 184 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1990).
87 B. v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A),33, 49-55 (1992).
88 X, Y & Z v. United Kingdom (No. 35), 1997-11 Eur. Ct. H.R. 619, 630-35; Sheffield &
Horsham v. United Kingdom (No. 82), 1998-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 2011, 2006-29 (distinguishing
B. v. France on the ground that the French civil registration system was more intrusive of
transsexual persons' privacy).
89 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32.
90 Id. at 29. Accord Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fam. L.R., 404, 473
(Austl.) (observing that "there is a remarkable consensus . . . that the law should treat post-
operative transsexuals as members of their re-assigned sex").
91 655 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2003) 1288 (statement of Lord Filkin, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs).
92 See 418 PARE. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 13-14 (statement of Mr. David Lammy,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs) ("There are no universally
applied international standards for gender recognition at present.").
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Part II-A explains how sex determinations are based on the relative weight-
ing of various sex characteristics. Part II-B discusses generally the use of
SRS as a determinative factor for gender recognition. Parts II-C through I1-
E discuss and critique courts' and legislatures' appeals to medical authority,
consistency and predictability, and public policy concerns.
A. What is "Sex"?
Beginning with Corbett v. Corbett, courts have generally under-
stood "sex" as describing a collection of physical and, perhaps, psychologi-
cal and social characteristics. In a formulation cited recently by an Ameri-
can court, those factors are:
(1) Internal morphologic sex (seminal vesicles/prostate or vagina/uterus/
fallopian tubes;
(2) External morphologic sex (genitalia);
(3) Gonadal sex (testes or ovaries);
(4) Chromosomal sex (presence or absence of Y chromosome);
(5) Hormonal sex (predominance of androgens or estrogens);
(6) Phenotypic sex (secondary sex characteristics, e.g. facial hair, breasts,
body type); and
(7) Personal sexual identity.93
Conceptualizing "male" and "female" as categories constituted by the pres-
ence or absence of certain characteristics illuminates the essential problem
of sex determination: How should these factors be weighted relative to one
another?
Courts have reached different conclusions in similar fact scenarios
by including different characteristics in their analysis, and by placing
greater or lesser weight on them. The British court in Corbett placed over-
whelming emphasis on chromosomes, and ignored "psychological factors."
The Australian court in Re Kevin, by contrast, emphasized identity and so-
cial role, combined with visible physical characteristics. 94 Once one decides
which attributes are essential to being a man or woman, which ones are of
lesser importance, and which ones are inconsequential, determining any
individual's sex should be relatively easy.
B. Surgery as a Determining Factor
Definitions of legal sex, and the criteria for changing it, are vari-
ously established by case law, legislation, and administrative regulations,
93 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 73 (Md. 2003). Such lists are commonly found in sex deter-
mination cases, see, e.g., Corbett v. Corbett, [1971] P. 83, 100 (U.K.); Dep't Soc. Sec'y v.
SRA, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 483 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.) (Lockhart J.).
94 Re Kevin (2001) 165 Fain. L.R. 404,475 (Austi.).
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with varying levels of specificity. 95 For example, in the United States,
twenty-three states and the District of Columbia prescribe conditions for
change of sex by statute, while the rest have left the issue to courts. 96 Dif-
ferent approaches to defining sex and change of sex cut across these meth-
ods of law-making. But while statutes and case law frame the issue in dif-
ferent ways, a strong emphasis on genitals is a common theme. Requiring
SRS as a condition of gender recognition is a natural consequence of this
emphasis. Some jurisdictions have gone so far as to require proof of SRS
before granting a change from a name associated with one gender to one
associated with another gender.97
In some jurisdictions, courts have read ambiguous statutes to re-
quire surgery; in others, notably South and Western Australia, courts have
read statutes not to require surgery when this has not been explicitly
stated.98 Many statutes use vague language suggesting some medical body
modification is required, without specifying whether and what type of sur-
gery may be required. For example, in the Netherlands an applicant must
demonstrate being "physically adjusted to the desired gender to the extent as
is possible and justified from [the] medical and psychological point of
view,"99 while in South Africa change of status is available to "[a]ny person
whose sexual characteristics have been altered by surgical or medical treat-
ment."' 00 Courts and commentators emphasize various reasons for requiring
95 Frederique Granet, Consolidated Report on Transsexualism in Europe, in COUNCIL OF
EUROPE, TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE 5, 10 (2000).
96 Heilig, 816 A.2d at 83-84 (citing twenty-two state statutes and a DC statute permitting
sex change, and Tennessee statute forbidding it). A word of caution: these statutes provide
for changes on the birth certificate, which may be presumed to have full legal effect-but
this may not be so in every jurisdiction. See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303,
310 ("The issuance of marriage licenses and new birth certificates are ministerial acts that
generally do not involve fact-finding .... The courts, on the other hand, are fact-finding
bodies, and in this particular instance the trial court found facts which the State Registrar did
not find and ruled accordingly.").
97 See, e.g., In re Application of Anonymous, 587 N.Y.S.2d 548 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1992); see
also In re Matter of Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1968) (emphasizing im-
portance of genital surgery in granting change from male to female name); In re Brian Har-
ris, 707 A.2d 225, 230 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (Saylor, J., dissenting) ("To permit [the peti-
tioner] to adopt an obviously female name would be to perpetuate a fiction, since the fact
remains that petitioner is anatomically a male until he undergoes reassignment surgery.").
98 Re Alex (2004) 180 Fam. L.R. 89, 229 (Austr.), available at http://www.familycourt.
gov/au/presence/resources/file/ebOO 1 848a4fb4f4/realex.pdf.
99 BW art. 29a-d 1985. For an English translation of the law, see http:/home.online.no/
-janel/net-law2.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2006).
100 Alteration of Sex Description and Sex Status Act 49 of 2003.
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SRS, which in some cases would create different results: medical truth; clar-
ity and consistency; and particular public policies. l1 '
C. Reliance on Medical Knowledge
[Tihe word transsexual. . . means crossing (trans) from one sex to the
other. But that makes certain a priori assumptions: that we know what sex
is, and that we know what 'crossing over' is. 102
An essential problem confronting courts and legislatures in matters
relating to gender recognition is that "neither science nor society has yet to
narrow in on a particular definition of sex." 103 The Maryland Supreme Court
states that "almost all courts have recognized that the question of whether
and how sex or gender can be changed is one where the law depends upon
and, to a large extent, must follow medical facts."' 4 This, however, over-
states the case. Expert witnesses and medical authorities differ dramatically
as to what the "medical facts" are. Moreover, courts sometimes reject medi-
cal opinions which contradict their preferred outcome. Finally, many gender
recognition cases simply have not considered medical opinions but have
relied solely on public policy arguments.
1. Inconsistent Medical Opinion
Medical experts consulted in gender recognition cases give widely
varying answers as to what features determine an individual's sex: some
101 See also Gender Confirmation of Transsexual Act, 2002, N:o 563, §1(1) (Fin.), avail-
able at http://www.transtukipiste.fi/en/transsexualism/ttp8407.php (requiring "a medical
statement of permanently belonging to the opposite sex"); Sex Reassignment Act, 1988, No.
49, Part III (S. Aust.) (requiring proof of a "medical or surgical procedure (or combination of
such procedures) to alter the genitals and other sexual characteristics"); 410 ILL. COMP. STAT.
535/17(d) (2002) (requiring "[a]n affidavit by a physician that... by reason of [an] operation
the sex designation... should be changed"); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-269(E) (2005) (requir-
ing "a certified copy of a court order... indicating that the sex of an individual has been
changed by medical procedure"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 26-2-11 (2005) (requiring a court order
and failing to define what constitutes a "sex change"). Similarly, Turkey's law once required
but did not define "sexual conversion"; the law has since been amended to clearly require
SRS. Compare CrvIL CODE Law No. 3444 (May 4, 1988) (Turk.), available in English in
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, TRANSSEXUALISM IN EUROPE 63 (2000) with ELA ANIL ET AL., THE NEW
LEGAL STATUS OF WOMEN IN TURKEY 30-31 (2002), available at http://
www.wwhr.org/images/newlegalstatus.pdf (describing the new requirements).
102 MELANIE MCMULLAN & STEPHEN WHITTLE, TRANSVESTISM, TRANSSEXUALISM AND THE
LAW 16 (1994) (emphasis added).
103 Briana Lynn Morgan, Note, The Use of Rules and Standards to Define a Transsexual's
Sex for the Purpose of Marriage: An Argument for a Hybrid Approach, 55 HASTINGS L. J.
1329, 1365 (2003-2004).
104 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 87 (Md. 2003).
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continue to opine that sex cannot be changed,105 while many assert that SRS
determines a transsexual person's gender. 0 6 Yet others maintain that sex
can be medically altered without SRS.' °7 This variance arises because, in
the words of a foundational handbook of endocrinology, "There is no such
biological entity as sex."' 08 Medicine is concerned with particular character-
istics and processes of the body, which tend to be grouped in such a way as
to make for ready categorization of most individuals into one of two
groups.
109
Thus, the medical textbook continues, "[s]ex is not a force that pro-
duces these contrasts; it is merely a name for our total impression of the
differences."" 10 This "total impression" has in itself no biological reality or
significance, though the individual characteristics do."'1 The Australian
Family Court recognized that, "[a]ttributing some kind of primacy to [a
particular] aspect of the person [in determining sex] is not a medical conclu-
sion. It is a social or legal one.""12 As one embryologist-turned-social-
scientist writes, "[w]e may use science to help us make the decision, but




105 See, e.g., Littleton v. Prange, 9 S.W.2d 223, 231 (Tex. App. 1999) ("Some physicians
would consider [a post-operative trans woman] a female; other physicians would consider
her still a male.").
106 See, e.g., Richards v. U.S. Tennis Ass'n, 400 N.Y.S.2d 267, 272 (S. Ct. 1977) (relying
heavily on expert testimony that "psychologically ... endocrinologically ... somatically...
[and] socially Dr. Richards is female [and her] gonadal status us that of an ovarectomized
female"); J.G. v. Pengarah Jabatan Pendaftaran Negara, 366 MALAYAN L. J. Unreported 1, 9
(Malay.) (showing that while some courts have declared transsexualism an issue for the
legislature, "the legislative body would depend on medical opinions. And here, in the instant
case, the medical men have spoken: the plaintiff is FEMALE")
107 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 468 (Black C.J.); B v. A, [1990] 1
O.R.3d 569 574-75.
108 Frank R. Lillie, General Biological Introduction, in SEX AND INTERNAL SECRETIONS: A
SURVEY OF RECENT RESEARCH 3 (Edgar Allen ed., 1939).
109 For example, an XY karyotype is often found together with sperm production. Sperm
production is often found together with the presence of a penis. The presence of a penis,
however, is seldom found together with pronounced breast development.
110 Lillie, supra note 110, at 3.
1 Thus, when we speak of differing health risks for men and women, we are really talking
about risks associated with specific X-linked genes, hormone levels, or other characteristics
that are correlated with sex but do not directly correspond to it; "sex" is in this context a
shorthand term.
112 Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fam. L.R. 404,463 (Austl.).
113 FAUSTO-STERLING, supra note 23, at 3. Specifically, science can aid these decisions by
defining what physiological and psychological characteristics are associated with sex; what
combinations of those characteristics are seen in humans; and the relative frequencies of
various combinations.
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While it must often rely on experts from other fields, the law recog-
nizes that their expertise always has its limits."14 Any scientific expert
would go beyond her expertise in attempting to identify an individual's
"true" race, 115 or to opine on the point at which human life begins. 116 Some
concepts-such as disability ' 17 and insanity' 18 in U.S. law-have legal defi-
nitions with medical components; medical experts help courts to apply the
medical parts of these tests. When it comes to gender, however, courts have
expected doctors to go beyond their expertise and determine the legal test
itself.
2. Inconsistent Use of Medical Opinion
In light of all this, it would be surprising indeed if courts relied
solely on medical evidence to determine the sex of persons. In fact, courts
seem to rely on medical opinions selectively. The Federal Court of Australia
dismissed a medical report stating that the respondent "is no less a woman
for not having had surgery, nor would she be any more a woman for having
had the surgery."" 9 It relied instead on "ordinary English usage," conclud-
ing that a person "may be said.. .to have undergone a sex change" only after
SRS. 120 Likewise, an Ontario court "differ[ed] with" medical reports that the
114 See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI, UNDERSTANDING EVIDENCE 324 (2d ed. 2006) ("An expert
qualified on one subject may not be qualified on another (even a related) subject.").
115 See, e.g., Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "'Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIz.
ST. L.J. 1093, 1113-22 (2004) (summarizing discrediting of "race" as biological category).
116 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973) (observing that "those trained in the respec-
tive disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus"
on this question); see also Planned Parenthood v. Rounds, 467 F.3d 716 (8th Cir. 2006)
(following this conclusion in Roe to invalidate requirement that women seeking abortions be
told pregnancy is "a whole, separate, unique, living human being").
"' See 42 U.S.C. §12102(2) (defining "disability" as a medical impairment that substan-
tially limits a major life activity); see also, Chai R. Feldblum, Rectifying the Tilt: Equality
Lessons from Religion, Disability, Sexual Orientation, and Transgender, 54 ME. L. REV. 159,
181-83 (2002) (noting that social impairments characteristic of "disability" are "the result of
[a] particular society's pre-existing choices").
118 See generally KATE E. BLOCH & KEVIN C. MCMUNIGAL, CRIMINAL LAW: A
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 553-69 (2005) (discussing various approaches to insanity de-
fense).
119 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 468 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.)
(Black C.J.).
120 Id. at 469, 472. See also Kantaras v. Kantaras, 884 So.2d 155, 161 (rejecting trial
court's finding of fact, in an exhaustive 800-page opinion reviewing medical opinion, case
law, and legal commentary on transsexualism, that sex can be changed by medical interven-
tion, and relying instead on "common meaning of male and female"). Both SRA and Kanta-
ras echo the U.S. Supreme Court's 1923 holding that "the understanding of the common
man," and not anthropological classifications, controlled the meaning of "White person" for
naturalization purposes. U.S. v. Thind, 261 U.S. 204, 206 (1923). In all three cases, courts
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applicant's treatment was sufficient to permanently change his sex. 21 Nev-
ertheless, when experts testified in an Illinois case that the petitioner's sur-
gery was incomplete, the court relied heavily on their opinions.
22
3. Parting Ways with Medical Opinion
As with Shakespeare's famous quip about the devil's use of Scrip-
ture, medical science can be and has been used to support every conceiv-
able conclusion about the sex of persons. But as the Swiss court in Leber
early recognized, law need not turn to medicine for its conclusions in this
area. Faced with medical testimony that sex is immutable, the Neuchdtel
Cantonal Court concluded that, "In Law, if not in Medicine, it is really a
change of sex which has taken place [in Ms. Leber's case]., 124 Instead of
medical expertise, the court grounded its decision in public policy con-
cerns-what it called "the interests of public order and morality."'' 25 The
Family Court of Australia has echoed this view, stating that "the task of the
law is not to search for some mysterious entity, the person's 'true sex,' but
to give an answer to a practical human problem."' 26 The ECHR rejected the
arguments of member states that "the law should fasten on the reality" of
sex rather than mere "appearances" brought about through medical interven-
tion. 27 The Court "is not persuaded ... that the state of medical science or
scientific knowledge provides any determining argument as regards the le-
gal recognition of transsexuals.' 28 Instead of relying entirely on medical
opinions, jurisdictions have created tests for sex determination based on
supposed public policy concerns, discussed below.
turned away from scientific knowledge and embraced popular prejudices in order to restrict
the bounds of socially important categories.
121 B v. A, [1990] 10.R.3d 569, 574-75.
122 See In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 308-09 (111. App. Ct. 2005).
123 "The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose." WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT
OF VENICE, Act I, Scene III, Line 95.
124 Requete de A.-L. Leber, 8 Recueil De Jugements Du Tribunal Cantonal De La Republi-
que Et Canton De Neuchftel [Cantonal Court] 536 (1945), translated in DE SAVITSCH, supra
note 45, at 106 (emphasis added).
125 Id. at 105.
126 Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fam. L.R. 404, 425 (Austl.).
127 B v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 33, 49 (1992). The Court relied on medical evi-
dence not to determine the "true sex" of applicants, but only to determine the existence of "a
physical, not merely psychological explanation of [transsexualism], which would mean there
could be no excuse for refusing to take it into account in law." Id. at 48. See also SHARPE,
supra note 69, at 51-52 (discussing the treatment of scientific knowledge of sex in earlier
ECHR judgments).
128 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 29.
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D. A Bright-Line Rule That Isn't
One reason for requiring SRS is that it "provides a convenient and
workable line for the law to draw."'129 The certainty and consistency of a
bright-line rule supposedly eliminate the "spectral difficulties" involved in
evaluating other relevant factors, 30 such as "the person's self-perception as
a man or woman [and] the extent to which the person has functioned in so-
ciety as [such].'' Since international medical standards call for an ex-
tended period of psychosocial evaluation prior to SRS, 132 post-operative
individuals can be presumed to meet the implied criteria of self-perception
and social functioning. 1
33
However, the SRS requirement may not in fact provide great con-
sistency and predictability, since the statutes and much of the case law re-
quiring surgery do not spell out what constitutes "sex reassignment sur-
gery." Moreover, there is "no 'standard' operation or recognized definition
of. . . completed surgery.' ' 134 It may or may not include removal of internal
reproductive organs. It may or may not include mastectomy for trans men.
Likewise, it is not clear whether "sex reassignment surgery" means phal-
loplasty, metoidioplasty, or either one.
Recall that "Kevin" had undergone surgical breast reduction and
removal of the uterus and ovaries. He appears male in almost all respects,
but still has a vagina. The Family Court of Australia, relying on expert
medical testimony, regarded him as "post-operative" and legally male.1
35
129 Re Kevin, 165 Fam. L.R. at 474 (Austl.).
130 See Bellinger v. Bellinger [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1140, 2002 Fam. 150, 190 (A.C.) (U.K.)
(Thorpe, L.J. dissenting); accord Goodwin, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. at 31; see also Morgan,
supra note 105, at 1370-75.
13' Re Kevin, 165 Fam. L.R. at 475 (Austl.).
132 THE HARRY BENJAMIN INTERNATIONAL GENDER DYSPHORIA ASSOCIATION'S, STANDARDS
OF CARE FOR GENDER IDENTITY DISORDERS 19 (2001), available at http://www.hbigda.org/
soc.htm.
'33 Morgan, supra note 105, at 1372. Accord Re Kevin, 165 Fam. L.R. at 414 (Austl.);
Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 469 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.) (Black
C.J.) (quoting the lower tribunal's statement that "[tihe fact that a person has undergone
surgery would also satisfy the requirement that their social and cultural identity conforms to
that of the reassigned sex."); Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. HH [1991] 23 A.L.D. 53, 23 (Admin.
App. Trib., Austl.). While jurists have generally placed great trust in medical authorities,
there is at least one French case in which judges expressed skepticism about the appropriate-
ness of SRS and the authenticity of a post-operative woman's gender identity. See SHARPE,
supra note 69, at 54-55.
134 Bellinger v. Bellinger [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467, 479 (Judgment of Lord
Nichols) (U.K.).
135 Supra notes 1-7 and accompanying text. Although Kevin had eschewed a phalloplasty
procedure because of its costs and risks, the Australian Attorney-General at no time "sought
to argue that the sex-reassignment surgery was in any way incomplete or unsuccessful." Re
Kevin 165 Far. L.R. at 411 (Austl.).
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But in a recent American case, an Illinois appeals court, also relying on ex-
pert medical testimony, regarded a similarly situated man as legally female
on the grounds that "there were other surgeries which had to be done on
[him] before he could be considered completely sexually reassigned."'136 An
Ontario court held similarly in the case of B. v A., interpreting the statutory
requirement that "the anatomical sex structure of a person is changed to a
sex other than that which appears on the registration at birth" to require the
construction of masculine external genitalia.'37
Tellingly, a ten-year study of the application of the German Trans-
sexuals' Act demonstrated such "considerable regional differences" be-
tween judges in determining what constituted reassignment surgery that
"[o]ne got the impression that prerequisites for ... sex change applications
were arbitrary."'138 For example, one commentator notes conflict among
German courts as to whether, in transsexual men, the fashioning of a phallus
and scrotum must be supplemented by occlusion of the vagina-thus assur-
ing that the individual cannot be the receptive party in vaginal intercourse,
i.e. function "as a woman."' 139 Since most laws requiring surgery are no
more specific than Germany's, this phenomenon may be widespread. For
example Turkey's law is also "subject to wide interpretation by local
judges."'140 Quebec's statute was unclear and interpreted to require phal-
loplasty for trans men until a 1999 court challenge. 141
Such variable interpretation renders the supposed benefits of a
bright-line rule illusory. One reason given for abandoning the Corbett ap-
proach was the avoidance of situations where individuals were simply un-
able to comply with a bright-line rule. 142 As explained in Part I-A, however,
136 In re Marriage of Simmons, 825 N.E.2d 303, 309. The court's description of the facts
suggests that Mr. Simmons had not had breast reduction surgery but nevertheless, by all
appearances had a "male torso." Id. at 308. Given the wide variation in breast size and shape
among as well as between men and women, surely a change of sex cannot depend on breast
reduction surgery in such a case.
13' B v. A, [1990] 1 O.R.3d 569, 573-75 (1990) (Change of status requires "some radical
and irreversible surgical intervention with all the fundamental reproductive organs, more
than their simple removal").
138 C. Weitze & S. Osburg, Empirical Data on Epidemiology and Application of the Ger-
man Transsexuals' Act During Its First Ten Years, 2 INT'L J. TRANSGENDERISM pt. 1(1998),
http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc0303.htm.
139 Will, supra note 48, at 89-90.
140 Liberty, supra note 73.
141 VIVIANE NAMASTE, SEX CHANGE, SOCIAL CHANGE: REFLECTION ON IDENTITY,
INSTITUTIONS, AND IMPERIALISM 5 (2005). The suit was settled out of court when the Office
of Civil Status agreed to provide a change in designation following mastectomy and hyster-
ectomy. Quebec Transman Resolves His Civil Status, GENDERNEws, Apr. 19, 1999, http://
www.ifge.org/news/1 999/apr/nws99aprl 9.htm.
142 Morgan, supra note 105.
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many individuals cannot readily comply with surgery requirements either.
While Italian courts have apparently carved out an exception to the re-
quirement of surgery for those whose medical condition prevents it,143 this,
too, raises serious line-drawing issues.144
E. Public Policy Rationales
In explaining and justifying the surgery requirement, case and statu-
tory law rely on one or more of four criteria based on supposed public pol-
icy concerns. These criteria are (1) sex-appropriate sexual function; (2) sex-
appropriate genital appearance; (3) irreversible physical changes; and (4)
fertility, or lack thereof. Because concern over enabling "same-sex" mar-
riages permeates these discussions, this section will consider both the ex-
planations courts have given for rejuiring surgery and the relation of these
criteria to marriage more generally.
1. Sexual Function
Jurisdictions dealing with this issue by statute do not mention sex-
ual function. Many judicial opinions, however, emphasize that the post-
operative individual is able to take the role in heterosexual intercourse "ap-
propriate" to her reassigned sex. 146 For example, one Australian court noted
that "[f]unctionally [the respondent] is a member of her new sex and capa-
ble of sexual intercourse." In one early case, a New Jersey appellate court
framed sexual function as a crucial condition for sex change:
If ... the postoperative transsexual is, by virtue of medical treatment,
thereby possessed of the full capacity to function sexually as a male orfe-
male ... we perceive no legal barrier, cognizable social taboo, or reason
grounded in public policy to prevent that person's identification[,] at least
for purposes of marriage[,] to the sex finally indicated. 147
143 Stefano Febeni, The Rights of Transsexual and Transgender Persons: The Italian Legal
Framework and New National and European Challenges (2002), http://tgeu.net/Documents/
CoOl1ICGILWorkersOutTgRights.pdf ("Only in a few isolated cases the change of legal
sex and name has been authorised even without the surgical intervention ... [in these cases],
the intervention had been previously established by the judge but it could not be carried out
due to the health conditions of the person concerned.").
144 See infra note 199-201 and accompanying text.
145 For purposes of this discussion, I assume arguendo that limiting marriage to different-
sex couples is a legitimate public policy. If the opposite were assumed, much of the concern
over sex determination would presumably evaporate, inasmuch as sex distinctions in other
areas of law are increasingly rare and less emotionally charged.
146 This is, perhaps, to be expected, considering that most sex determination cases have
arisen in the context of marriage.
147 M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d 204,210-11 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976).
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As an additional or alternative requirement, Australian and New
Zealand courts have noted that the reassigned individual was at least unable
to take the role in intercourse appropriate to their birth sex.
148
In the context of marriage these criteria might be rationalized on the
basis of the traditional requirement of ability to consummate, but Australian
legal scholar Andrew Sharpe points out that in the jurisdictions deciding
these cases, consummation is largely or wholly irrelevant to the validity of
marriages. 149 Rather, these courts seek "not so much to ensure that a particu-
lar sexual practice occur within marriage but rather seek to ensure that other
sexual practices do not.' 50 In other words, if it is no longer legally required
that the husband be able to sexually penetrate the wife in the traditional
way, it is at least expected that the wife must not be able to sexually pene-
trate the husband (either because the wife has a penis or because the hus-
band has a vagina). The implication is that these would be in some impor-
tant sense same-sex marriages.151 Yet in one way or another all wives can
148 Att'y Gen. v. Otahuhu Faro. Ct. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603, 607 ("Once a transsexual has
undergone surgery, he or she is no longer able to operate in his or her original sex"); Dep't of
Soc. Sec'y v. SRA (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 493 (Fed Ct. Austl., Gen Div) (Lockhart J.) ("Af-
ter surgery, a male-to-female transsexual is no longer a functional male.").
149 SHARPE, supra note 69, at 91-92.
150 Id. at 196.
151 Id. at 96 (stating that the focus on genitals is intended to "insulate marriage .. from
perceived 'homosexual' practice"). The focus on sexual function is only the most obvious
way in which the courts construct maleness and femaleness as essentially heterosexual. As
Sharpe notes, "the homophobia of law proves important, if not central, to an understanding
of the transgender/law relation." Id. at 141; see generally id at 89-134. Thus, the appellate
court in New Jersey stated-and Singapore's High Court repeated-that the capacity to
marry "requires the coalescence of both physical ability and the psychological and emotional
orientation to engage in sexual intercourse as either a male or a female," i.e., heterosexually.
MT., 355 A.2d at 209; Lim Ying v. Hiok Kian Ming Eric, [1992] 1 S.L.R. 184, 190 (Sing.)
(emphasis added). A few courts have appeared to use litigants' sexual histories to either
confirm or call into question the authenticity of their gender claims. The New Jersey court
noted that "[a]s a youngster [the plaintiff] ... became very interested in boys." MT., 355
A.2d at 205. By contrast, the Berlin Court of Appeal found a trans woman's pre-transition
marriage to be "a sign of her male orientation at that time." Van Kuck v. Germany, 2003-VII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 12 (following civil suit against insurance company for denial of reimburse-
ment for sex reassignment surgery, the ECHR held that the German court's denial that SRS
was medically necessary violated the rights to a fair hearing and private life). Even the Euro-
pean Commission on Human Rights, in rejecting the claim of a German trans woman that her
country's requirement of SRS violated fundamental rights, found it significant that "follow-
ing the dissolution of his [sic] first marriage, the applicant married [a woman] again in 1994
and had another child." Roetzheim v. Germany, 91-A Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 40,
45 (1997). The implicit conflation of authentic gender with heterosexuality in these opinions
is deeply offensive in its heterosexism, and echoes the lingering cultural suspicion that gay
and lesbian people are not "real" men and women. As previously noted, supra note 14 and
accompanying text, many transsexual men and women are gay, lesbian and bisexual; their
identities are no less authentic and their transitions no less complete because they are not
heterosexual.
[Vol. 38:393
2006-2007] AGAINST THE SURGICAL REQUIREMENT 419
sexually penetrate their husbands if so inclined. In any event, the possibility
of particular private sexual acts seems a dubious basis for dividing permit-
ted from prohibited marriages in light of contemporary notions of marital
privacy.'5 If it is not the state's business what married people actually do in
bed, it is no more the state's business what they are able to do in bed.
2. Appearance
In reviewing relevant court decisions and state statutes, Maryland's
high court concluded that for purposes of gender recognition, it was crucial
that "the external genitalia [be] brought into consistency with that indicative
of the new gender."'153 Noting that "[t]here are many forms of sexual ex-
pression possible [in marriage] without penetrative sexual intercourse,"
New Zealand's Family Court emphasized genital appearance rather than
sexual function. 154 The same court stated that while "neither constructed
organ needs to be fully sexually functional," women must have vaginas, and
men penises.1
55
Similarly, in denying a wife's pension to a pre-operative trans
woman, an Australian federal judge mentioned "external genital features"
several times, suggesting that in "common English usage" a person born
male is said to have changed sex only when they have "assumed, speaking
generally, the external genital features of a woman.' 56 A Canadian court
also emphasized the "apparent form" of the genitalia in denying a trans
man-who had undergone extended hormone therapy and mastectomy and
lived as a man for more than fifteen years-an order for interim spousal
support based on a cohabiting relationship of more than twenty years.1
57
Courts treat this requirement as obvious and reasonable. The stat-
utes and case law indicate no public purpose behind it, however, beyond
lawmakers' discomfort at "the 'monstrosity' of the pre-operative body"
(i.e., of the man with a vagina and the woman with a penis). 5 8 Without a
152 See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) ("Would we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of con-
traceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage
relationship.").
"' In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 87 (Md. 2003).
154 Att'y Gen. v. Otahuhu Fam. Ct. [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R 603, 615.
155 id.
156 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467,469, 472 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen.
Div.) (Black C.J.). This language was later cited by a lower court in denying an age pension
to a trans woman who had undergone orchiectomy (removal of the testes) but not vagino-
plasty. SRDD v. Dep't of Family and Cmty. Servs, [1999] 56 A.L.D. 777 (Austr.).
157 B v. A, [1990] 1 O.R.3d 569 (Ont.).
158 SHARPE, supra note 69, at 102 (noting that this discomfort is closely tied to the specter
of homosexuality).
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firm grounding in some recognizable public interest, this preoccupation
with the appearance of body parts that are already hidden from public view
has no justification.
Instead of a focus on what is unseen in daily life, a focus on what is
seen-the gender an individual functions as and presents in daily life-is
more consonant with the rationales for prohibiting same-sex marriage re-
cently announced by American courts. While legislatures may believe (de-
spite mounting social science evidence) that "it is better, other things being
equal, for children to grow up with both a mother and a father,"'5 9 transsex-
ual persons' ability to fill these gendered parental roles does not vary before
and after SRS. Similarly, assuming that restricting marriage to different-sex
couples is meant to communicate a societal endorsement of different-sex
coupling, that message is muddled when many who live and appear as dif-
ferent-sex cannot marry because of socially invisible characteristics.16
0
3. Irreversibility
A second crucial requirement for recognition noted by the Maryland
high court is that "the change is regarded as permanent or irreversible.'
61
Re Kevin refers repeatedly to the "irreversible" nature of the applicant's
surgery, and that of parties in other cases the court reviewed, apparently
hoping to assuage fears about the implications of its landmark decision.
62
Courts consider the irreversibility of SRS a bulwark against ill-
considered changes of sex, contrasting "irreversible sex reassignment sur-
gery" with "a mere whim."' 163 The court in SRA thus described the require-
ment of SRS as a way of "confirming the person's psychological atti-
tude." 164 An Australian judge in R v. Harris and McGuinness indicated a
similar concern with permanence:
The law could not countenance a definition of male or female which de-
pends on how a particular person views his or her own gender. The conse-
159 Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); see also Anderson v. King County,
138 P.3d 963, 983(Wash. 2006) ("[T]he legislature was entitled to believe that providing that
only opposite-sex couples may marry will encourage procreation and child-rearing in a "tra-
ditional" nuclear family where children tend to thrive.").
'60 This point is complicated, however, by the following: (1) any rule on sex determination
would, by one or another definition, permit some same-sex unions and prohibit some differ-
ent-sex unions, and (2) possession of a marriage certificate is itself invisible; and whether a
couple's self-proclaimed marriage is legally recognized is ordinarily assumed by others on
the basis of their apparent sex.
161 In re Heilig, 816 A.2d 68, 87 (Md. 2003).
162 Kevin v. Att'y Gen. (Re Kevin), (2001) 165 Fain. L.R. 404, 474, 476 (Austl.).
163 M.T. v. J.T., 355 A.2d at 207 (quoting trial court opinion).
164 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 494 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.)
(Lockhart J.).
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quence of such an approach would be that a person could change sex from
year to year despite the fact that the person's chromosomes are immuta-
ble.16
5
Another judge in the same case concluded that such a rule "would
be vulnerable to abuse by people who were not true transsexuals at all. 166
The now outdated clinical term "true transsexual" assumed that only the
unhesitating drive for SRS established the authenticity of trans people's
gender identities.
167
In addition to "affirming the patient's psychological sex choice,"
judges have viewed requiring SRS as essential to "protect[ ] the public
against fraud" 168---especially the fraudulent attainment of same-sex mar-
riages, 169 but also more typical kinds of identity fraud.170 "[I]t is dubious,"
stated one New York judge, "that any one would go through such drastic
procedures as sex reassignment surgery for the purpose of deceiving credi-
tors or avoiding the draft.'' Courts have generally failed to recognize that
an individual undergoing cross-sex hormone therapy to perpetrate such
fraud, or living in a gender they don't identify with for many years, is
equally unlikely. As one state court recognized, "the probability of so-called
fraud, if any, exists to a much greater extent when the birth certificate is
permitted... to classify this individual as a 'male' when, in fact.., the indi-
vidual comports himself [sic] as a 'female."",172 The lack of any reported
165 R. v. Harris & McGuinness (1988) 17 N.S.W.L.R. 158, 170 (Carruthers J.). The signifi-
cance of the reference to chromosomes here, when the court had already discarded chromo-
somes as a test of legal sex, is unclear.
166 Id. at 181 (Mathews, J.).
167 The classification of trans people as "true" and otherwise, although increasingly out of
favor in the medical field, has left a deep impression upon jurists, who assume that genital
surgery is the only reliable indication that a trans person's gender identity is abiding and
authentic.
168 Dep't Soc. Sec'y v. HH, (1991) 23 A.L.D. 58 (Admin. App. Trib., Austl.). See also
SHARPE, supra note 69, at 53-54 (discussing how "the 'authenticity' of transgender identity
becomes tied to bodily change" in the Rees v. UK case).
169 Cf. B v. A, [1990] 10.R.3d 569, 575.
170 This has been a greater concern for courts considering name changes in jurisdictions
where such changes are subject to judicial scrutiny. See generally, Sheila Lee Pearson, In re
McIntyre: A Victory for Pre-operative Transgender Persons, 8 LAW & SEXUALITY 731
(1998) (surveying transsexual name change cases).
171 Anonymous v. Mellon, 398 N.Y.S.2d 99, 102 (N.Y.Sup. Ct. 1977) (declining neverthe-
less to overrule administrative denial of change of birth certificate since the absence of any
single factor determining sex made it "impossible" to hold such a determination arbitrary and
without basis).
172 Matter of Anonymous, 293 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (N.Y.Civ. Ct. 1968). While this case
concerned a post-operative individual, the court's reasoning applies equally to those who
have not had SRS.
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cases of individuals seeking a change of official sex for fraudulent purposes,
and the increasing number of methods for tracking and confirming personal
identity, suggest that fraud is not a real concern in permitting gender recog-
nition.
4. Fertility
To the extent that the surgical requirement is tied to the prohibition
of "same-sex" marriages, it finds no support in the chief rationale upon
which that prohibition has been upheld, namely the link between marriage
and procreation. 17 3 In explaining this rationale American courts have noted
that "[i]ndividuals may marry regardless of fertility or intent to procreate.
The sterile and elderly are allowed to marry, and married couples are not
required to have children."1 74 Inability to procreate together is not an im-
pediment to different-sex couples where one has had SRS, and nor should it
be for those same couples in the absence of SRS. These same courts have
noted that, "if the State excluded opposite-sex couples from marriage based
on their intention or ability to procreate, the State would have to inquire
about that subject before issuing a license, thereby implicating constitution-
ally rooted privacy concerns.' ' 175 The sex determination cases quoted
throughout this Note represent just the sort of "grossly intrusive inquiries,
and arbitrary and unreliable line-drawing" these courts fear.
176
Some jurisdictions, including Finland, Germany, Japan, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland, actually require that individuals
seeking to change their sex be sterile.177 Japan has a further requirement,
unique in the world, that applicants for gender recognition be childless.
178
Interestingly, while commentators have insisted that "[s]terility must be
absolutely certain and permanent," and debated exactly what should qualify
one as sterile, they have not articulated specific justifications for this re-
173 See, e.g. Anderson v. King County, 138 P.3d 963, 982 (Wash. 2006); Hemandez v.
Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006); Citizens for Equal Prot. v. Bruning, 455 F.3d 859, 867
(8th Cir. 2006); Morrison v. Sadler, 821 N.E.2d 15, 25 (Ind.App. 2005); Standhardt v. Supe-
rior Court, 77 P.3d 451, 462 (Ariz.App. Div. 1 2003).
174 Andersen, 138 P.3d at 982; see also Sadler, 821 N.E.2d at 27 (marriage restriction valid
"regardless of whether there are some opposite-sex couples that wish to marry but one or
both partners are physically incapable of reproducing").
"' Standhardt, 77 P.3d at 462.
176 Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 12.
177 Granet, supra note 97, at 11-16; Emerton, Time for Change, supra note 78, at 548 (Ja-
pan); The Gender Confirmation of Transsexual Individuals Act No 563/2002 (Fin). available
at http://www.pfc.org.uk/files/Finland_2002.pdf.
178 Emerton, Time for Change, supra note 78, at 548 ("Notably, no other country's legisla-
tion makes childlessness a pre-condition for a legal change of gender").
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quirement.17 9 Rather, sterility has been treated as self-evident. 8° Critics
suggest that these requirements have more than a hint of eugenics about
them.18' While no one has yet suggested that transsexualism is hereditary,
some have suggested that transsexual parents are a harmful influence. 182 In
Japan, for example, "[t]he rationale for [requiring that individuals have no
children] is that children would be confused should a parent change his or
her registered sex.',
183
Judges and lawmakers also seem to be prompted by the rather
amorphous "fear of the pregnant man,"184 and of the prospect of a woman
siring children. For example, an Australian court stated that, "There are, I
think, dangers in a male capable ... of procreation being classified by the
law as a female," without suggesting what those dangers might be. 85 An
earlier Australian tribunal thought such "inherent" dangers "apparent. 186
One ECHR judge, dissenting in the landmark judgment against France,
warned of "the possibility of artificial insemination after rectification or
after an operation. The whole of civil law and inheritance law could be
thrown into confusion.' 87
179 Will, supra note 48, at 88.
180 Stephen Whittle, Gemeinschaftsfremden-or How to Be Shafted by Your Friends, in
LEGAL QUEERIES: LESBIAN, GAY AND TRANSGENDER LEGAL STUDIES 42 (Leslie J. Moran et
al. eds., 1998).
181 Id. A British Government interdepartmental working group observed ominously that
"[t]hose states in which there are sterility requirements ... are generally those where, in the
past, negative eugenics (the forced sterilization of unfit, asocial, groups of people) was ac-
cepted medical practice." UK HOME OFFICE, REPORT OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL WORKING
GROUP ON TRANSSEXUAL PEOPLE, 2000, 46, available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/constitution/
transsex/wgtrans.pdf.
182 Cf Kari J. Carter, Note, The Best Interest Test and Child Custody: Why Transgender
Should Not Be a Factor in Custody Determinations, 16 HEALTH MATRIX 209 (2006) (citing
conflicting U.S. case law on whether transsexualism or cross-dressing by parents threatens
best interest of child in custody disputes).
183 Associated Press, Japanese court rejects transsexual's request to change registered
gender, ADVOCATE.COM, Feb. 7, 2006, available at http://www.advocate.com/print-article-
ektid25191.asp. Robyn Emerton reports, however, that the restriction in fact had no rationale
beyond a pragmatic strategy "to propose a very conservative law which [supporters] knew
they could get through parliament quickly." Emerton, supra note 78, at 549.
184 UK HOME OFFICE, supra note 183, at 36 (internal quotation marks omitted).
185 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 495 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.)
(Lockhart J.).
186 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. HH, (1991), 23 A.L.D. 58, 20 (Admin. App. Trib., Austl.).
187 B v. France, 232 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 33, 66 (1992) (Pettiti J., dissenting). Whether the
judge was concerned about artificial insemination using the preserved sperm of a trans
woman, or the prospect-currently a medical impossibility--of the impregnation of a trans
woman, is unclear.
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Courts fail to articulate the threatened legal problems because none
exist. It would not only be unprecedented but unimaginable for an individ-
ual's parental rights to be called into doubt simply because his or her role in
a child's conception seemed to contradict the parent's legal sex.' 88 Judges
assert that "dangers" exist, without meaningful reflection, because of under-
lying fears of the "bizarre" or "absurd": female fathers and male mothers,
making confusion, not of the law, but of common-sense notions of family
roles. Such amorphous anxieties have no place in shaping law.
III. GENDER RECOGNITION, FAIRNESS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS
A legal rule with only a very weak basis in public policy, or even a
wholly irrational one, may go unchallenged if its harmful effects are few
and slight. The surgical requirement for gender recognition is far from
harmless. The following section discusses how this rule results in unequal
treatment and real harm to trans individuals' lives and human rights.
A. The Right to Equal Treatment
None of the cases emphasizing sexual function or genital appear-
ance have involved post-operative trans men. This is significant given "how
much more difficult it is to undergo successful female-to-male reconstruc-
tive surgery than the male to female.' 89 Surgeries for trans men do not re-
sult in a penis "with the full capacity to function sexually as a male" in the
sense of erection, penetration and ejaculation. New Zealand's Family Court
cited this differential as one reason for favoring an appearance test over a
sexual function test. 190
The appearance test seems to have the advantage of not operating as
a blanket exclusion of trans men. Nevertheless, it too may disproportion-
ately exclude trans men, because current surgical techniques produce a
much greater cosmetic approximation of typical genitals for trans women
than for trans men. Because it "is more advantageous and burdensome for
people seeking legal recognition of their transition from female to male
rather than male to female," Australia's Family Court has suggested in dicta
188 Likewise, threatened confusion with regard to inheritance-for example, in the interpre-
tation of a will leaving property to "my son" or "my father"--has never materialized in any
jurisdiction, and in any case could be avoided by statutory amendment. There have been a
few cases in Islamic courts in which family members have sought to deprive trans women of
much of their inheritance-since, under Islamic law, daughters are not entitled to as much as
sons. The courts have thus far ruled that where the inheritance preceded the transition, their
sex at the time decides the issue and the court need not decide whether to recognize a change
of sex. See, e.g., Saudi Court Rules in Favor of Transsexual, AL BAWABA, Dec. 16, 2004,
http://www.muslimwakeup.com/bb/viewtopic.php?p=12415.
189 Bellinger v. Bellinger [2001] EWCA (Civ) 1140, 2002 Fam. 150, 177 (A.C.) (U.K.).
190 Att'y Gen. v. Otahuhu Fam. Ct., [1995] 1 N.Z.L.R. 603, 615.
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that surgery requirements may operate as "a form of indirect [sex] discrimi-
nation."''
Additionally, these criteria are applied only to transsexual persons.
As noted above, the ability to engage in traditional sexual intercourse is not
a prerequisite for valid marriage in most of the jurisdictions under discus-
sion.' 92 Certainly, a person's status as a man or woman is not usually called
into question due to sexual dysfunction. Neither does it depend on posses-
sion of a penis or vagina; persons who have lost these features by accident,
or had them removed for medical reasons, retain the legal rights associated
with their gender. These requirements are visited on trans people because of
their inconsistent gender history, a fact beyond their control. Thus, surgical
requirements create unequal treatment of trans men in particular, and of
trans people in general. These disparities are unfair, and not compelled by
any public interest.'
93
B. The Right to Gender Recognition
The reasons given for requiring SRS seem particularly weak in rela-
tion to the individual rights this restriction implicates. Instead of relying on
medical expertise or traditional beliefs about gender to determine legal sex,
the ECHR's gender recognition jurisprudence has emphasized the individ-
ual's "freedom to define herself [or himself] as a female [or male] person."
194 The Court identifies this freedom as an aspect of the right to private life
under the European Convention, and characterizes it as "one of the most
basic essentials of self-determination. ' 95 In response to the U.K. Govern-
191 Re Alex (2004) 180 Fam. L.R. 89, 239, available at http://www.familycourt.gov.au/
presence/resources/file/eb0O I 848a4fb4f4/realex.pdf.
192 Supra note 153 and accompanying text.
193 Whether these disparities rise to the level of violating constitutional or treaty guarantees
of equal treatment is a complex question beyond the scope of this Note.
194 Van Kick v. Germany, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 12.
195 Id. American courts have come closest to recognizing a constitutional right to gender
recognition in the case of Darnell v. Lloyd, 395 F.Supp. 1210 (D. Conn. 1975). In that case, a
trans woman brought suit to obtain a corrected birth certificate. The district court denied the
Government's motions for dismissal and summary judgment, finding that Darnell's rights to
marry, to travel abroad, and to privacy were "at least tangentially" implicated, and that her
Equal Protection claim might also have merit, "if the record as more fully developed estab-
lishes that she is presently 'female."' Id. at 1214. In this light it may also be impermissible,
in the absence of a scientific consensus on the matter, for states to legislate a definition of
sex, just as they cannot legislate a determination of when human life begins. Cf Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-63 (1973) (holding that, in light of lack of religious, philosophical,
medical, or legal consensus on when life begins, the State may not adopt one theory of life in
order to override a pregnant woman's right to abortion); see also Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (describing "the right to define one's own concept of exis-
tence"). A similar argument has been made under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
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ment's argument that this was a complex and controversial matter within
states' "margin of appreciation," the Court in Goodwin stated unequivocally
that, "[i]n the twenty-first century the right of transsexuals to personal de-
velopment and to physical and moral security in the full sense enjoyed by
others in society cannot be regarded as a matter of controversy."'
96
It is curious, therefore, that the Court appeared to fasten on SRS as
the threshold of states' obligation to recognize that freedom. 197 Surgical
requirements make the enjoyment of this "basic" right impossible for indi-
viduals with certain medical conditions, as well as those who cannot afford
these expensive procedures. For others, gender recognition will remain out
of reach for years before SRS can be obtained. The then-Chief Justice of the
Family Court of Australia has thus criticized the surgical requirement (albeit
in dicta) as "a cruel and unnecessary restriction upon a person's right to
[gender recognition, with] little justification on grounds of principle."'
198
As in Italy, courts and legislators may recognize the inequities in-
volved in a strict surgical requirement yet desire to restrict any exceptions
for those who cannot have surgery.' 99 Any such limitation raises difficult
questions. How severe a complication must a patient face from SRS before
it is not required? How much more likely than average must the risk of such
a complication be? Can a line be drawn between risks affecting "only" qual-
ity of life and "serious" medical risks? 200 Should an exception also be made
for cases such as SRA, where "financial constraints are the only thing pre-
venting surgery" 201? These questions illuminate the basic balance involved
in making medical interventions a prerequisite for gender recognition. On
one side of that balance is any public interest in conformity between legal
and anatomical gender. On the other is the individual's right, not only to
gender recognition, but to bodily integrity.
doams. Lori Johnson, The Legal Status of Post-Operative Transsexuals, 2 HEALTH L.J. 159
(1994).
196 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 31.
197 Roetzheim v. Germany, 91-A Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 40 (1997) (holding
unanimously Germany's SRS and sterility requirements "appropriate" and not in violation of
right to private life). As one scholar said of the R v. Harris case, "It would seem that humani-
tarian and libertarian concerns expressed by the majority judges arise only in relation to...
persons falling on one side of the pre/post-operative dyad." SHARPE, supra note 69, at 67.
'98 Re Alex (2004) 180 Faro. L.R. 89, 66, available at http://www.fanilycourt.gov.au/
presence/resources/file/eb001848a4fb4f4/realex.pdf.
199 See Febeni, supra note 145 and accompanying text.
200 Although no source in English describes the facts of the Italian cases, they likely in-
volved individuals who would have very serious medical risks in having SRS. These cases
also likely left questions of line-drawing for later judges.
201 Dep't of Soc. Sec'y v. SRA, (1993) 118 A.L.R. 467, 478 (Fed. Ct. Austl., Gen. Div.)
(Lockhart J.).
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C. The Right to Bodily Integrity
Bodily integrity is universally recognized as a fundamental human
right, protected by national laws and constitutions as well as international
• 202
conventions. It is well established that a state violates that right by forc-
ing individuals to undergo invasive medical procedures. 20 3 The state, how-
ever, should not force an individual to forgo one basic right to enjoy an-
other.204 This is precisely what states do whenever they make surgery a pre-
requisite for gender recognition.
Several commentators have noted that surgery requirements create
perverse incentives; individuals "may find themselves coerced into major
surgical operations they otherwise would not have" in order to exercise their
right to gender recognition.2 °5 Under the European Convention, an individ-
202 See, e.g., X. and Y. v. Netherlands, 91 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 11 (1985) (right to private life
under European Convention Article 8 "covers the physical and moral integrity of the person.
..."); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (Due Process rights include right
to bodily integrity); Stephanie Weiler, Bodily Integrity: A Substantive Due Process Right to
Be Free From Rape by Public Officials, 34 CAL. W. L. REV. 591, 596-601 (1997-1998)
(summarizing U.S. common law and constitutional development of this right).
203 See, e.g., SARAH JOSEPH ET AL., THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND
POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIALS, AND COMMENTARY 254 (2004) (forced sterilization of
women violates ICCPR article 7); Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 237 (1990) (Stevens
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Every violation of a person's bodily integrity is
an invasion of his or her liberty. The invasion is particularly intrusive if it creates a substan-
tial risk of permanent injury .... Moreover, any such action is degrading if it overrides a
competent person's choice to reject a specific form of medical treatment."); Winston v. Lee,
470 U.S. 753, 759 (1985) ("A compelled surgical intrusion into an individual's body...
implicates expectations of privacy and security of such magnitude that the intrusion may be
'unreasonable' [under Fourth Amendment] even if likely to produce evidence of a crime.");
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 174 (1952) (forced stomach pumping violates the Due
Process Clause); X v. Austria, App. No. 8278/78, 18 Eur. Comm'n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 154
(1980) (stating that compulsory medical procedures, no matter how minor, interfere with the
right of bodily integrity and must be justified by public interest); Matter of Slovakia, App.
No. 31534/96, Eur. Ct. H.R. 62-72 at 8-11 (July 5, 1999), available at http://www.echr.
coe.int/eng (holding that a forcible examination in mental hospital interferes with the right to
privacy; there was no violation in the instant case, however, because the examination was in
accordance with law and justified by "protecting the applicant's own rights and health").
204 It would be difficult to find or to imagine another regulation that so squarely puts this
kind of choice to the individual. More common are those regulations, forbidden under the
U.S. Constitution that condition some discretionary public benefit upon the surrender of a
fundamental right. See, e.g., Board of County Comm'rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673-75
(1996) (holding that the First Amendment protects contractors from retaliatory termination
for speech, as well as summarizing free speech cases in the public employment context). The
Supreme Court has held more squarely in the federalism context that "[a] choice between
two unconstitutionally coercive regulatory techniques is no choice at all." New York v. U.S.,
505 U.S. 144, 176 (1992).
205 Bellinger v. Bellinger, [2003] UKHL 21, [2003] 2 A.C. 467, 479 (Judgment of Lord
Nichols). Accord Louis H. Schwartz, Updated Look at Legal Responses to Transsexualism, 1
427
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ual cannot be forced by police to choose between a compulsory gynecologi-
cal examination and indefinite imprisonment.20 6 Neither should an individ-
ual be forced by statute to choose between an undesired and invasive surgi-
cal procedure and the legal rights and formal recognition appropriate to his
or her gender. As one commentator put it, putting this choice to individuals
amounts to "forcing [them] under the scalpel. 2 °7
D. The Right to Religious Observance
Like bodily integrity, the right to freedom of religious practice is
deeply engrained in constitutional democracies, and should not easily be
compromised. As indicated above, for at least some Muslims and Jews the
surgical requirement forces a choice between gender recognition and fidel-
ity to religious principles.208
E. Balancing Interests
"[T]he fair balance ... between the general interest of the commu-
nity and the interests of the individual" 209 is the bedrock of human rights
jurisprudence. Yet as the foregoing discussion has shown, the Court's
statement in Goodwin that there are "no significant factors of public interest
to weigh against the interest of [the] individual [seeking gender recogni-
tion]" applies equally whether or not that individual has had SRS. Public
unease with pre- or non-operative transsexual bodies cannot outweigh the
individual's rights to equal treatment, gender recognition, and bodily integ-
rity. And while post-operative recognition has long been the dominant ap-
INT. J. TRANSGENDERISM pt. 2 (1997), available at http://www.symposion.com/ijt/ijtc020l.
html ("It is one thing to give legal recognition to surgery which is necessary. It is another
thing to create a legal inducement to have drastic genital surgery which, in the cases in ques-
tion, is at best optional, may be unwanted, and may from a medical point of view carry sub-
stantial risk to the person involved.").
206 Y.F. v. Turkey 2003-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 171, 178-82 (concluding that compulsory gyne-
cological examination violates right to privacy).
207 Will, supra note 48, at 93.
208 While some verses in both the Hadith and the Torah would seem to prohibit gender
transition altogether, the point here is not one of theological principle but of religious prac-
tice. So long as some Muslims and Jews earnestly believe that their religion sanctions transi-
tion but prohibits surgery, their right to religious observance does not depend on whether
their interpretation is correct or sanctioned by religious authority. See, e.g., Thomas v. Re-
view Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (holding that religious
beliefs need not be logical, consistent, or shared by all members of a religious group to enjoy
protection of Free Exercise Clause because "[c]ourts are not arbiters of scriptural interpreta-
tion.").
209 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 25; See supra note 89 and ac-
companying text.
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proach, it is not the only possible approach, as demonstrated by recent
events in the United Kingdom.
IV. THE U.K. GENDER RECOGNITION ACT: A MODEL FOR REFORM
A. Passage of the GRA
Parliament can do anything but make a man a woman and a woman a
210
man.
U.K. law maintained the position that sex is immutable for over
thirty years after the Corbett decision.21 During that time, this position was
subjected to frequent criticism as neighboring countries enacted laws or
issued decisions recognizing gender transition. A transsexual lobby group,
Press for Change, conducted a determined campaign to educate the public
and Members of Parliament about trans people and the issues facing
them.2 12 In 1999, the U.K. Home Office formed an Interdepartmental Work-
ing Group on Transsexual People, which issued a report on these issues the
following spring,213 but no further action was taken until the July 2002
judgment in Goodwin. Five months later, the Government announced its
intention to present a bill to provide legal recognition for transsexual peo-
ple.214 The Gender Recognition Act (GRA) 215 passed by wide margins in
both houses of Parliament, received Royal Assent on July 1, 2004, and took
effect six months later.21 6
210 Attributed originally to Henry Hubert, Second Earle of Pembroke, who is said to have
uttered this phrase in 1648, the saying was further popularized by legal commentator Jean
Louis DeLolme in the early nineteenth century and has become a well-known legal proverb.
H.A. Finlay, SEX CHANGE: MEDICAL AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF SEX REASSIGNMENT 117 at
n.163 (1988); see 421 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 1542 (statement of Parliament
member Edward Leigh).
211 See, e.g., B v. B, (2000) 58 B.M.L.R. 52, 65 (Fam.) (following Corbett).
212 See PRESS FOR CHANGE, MISSION STATEMENT (1996), http://www.pfc.org.uk/campaign/
pfcaims.htm.
213 UK HOME OFFICE, supra note 183.
214 UK SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS, THE DRAFT GENDER
RECOGNITION BILL: EXPLANATORY NOTES (2003), available at http://www.pfc.org.uk/gr-
bill/grben-dr.htm.
215 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7 (U.K.).
216 The bill passed 155-57 in the House of Lords, 657 PAR. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004)
1090, and 355-46 in the Commons. 421 PARE. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 1537.
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B. How the GRA Works
The GRA permits individuals to apply to a panel-consisting of at
least one medical and one legal expert2 '7-- to have their change of gender
recognized and a revised birth certificate issued. Individuals must establish
that they (1) have or have had gender dysphoria; (2) have lived for two
years in the "acquired gender"; and (3) intend to live in that gender until
death.2
18
Married applicants receive an "interim gender recognition certifi-
cate," and must have their marriage annulled before obtaining full recogni-
tion. Individuals who have gone through this process are considered to be
the acquired gender for all purposes,2 19 and access to their original birth
certificate will be strictly limited.220
The GRA is notable for the absence of any specific requirement of
medical treatment or body modification. The Government made clear
throughout the parliamentary process that,
The criteria [in the Bill] are designed to establish whether a person has
taken decisive steps to live fully and permanently in their acquired gender.
That must be the test for legal recognition .... not whether the person's
physiology fully conforms to the acquired gender and not whether they
"look the part." Such tests are inappropriate and inconsistent with our
broader ambition to respond to the needs and concerns of a small minority
221group.
This position reflected the Government's determination to "avoid
discriminating against people who for some medical reason unconnected
with their gender are unsuitable for particular kinds of surgical, hormonal or
other treatment," or who due to finances or hospital waiting lists must wait
217 The appointed membership of the Panel must include both one or more experienced
attorneys and one or more doctors or licensed psychologist. Gender Recognition Act, 2004,
c. 7, §1(4), sched.1 (U.K.).
211 Id. § 2(1). Alternatively, individuals may obtain recognition based on their change of
sex in another country with similar or stricter standards. Id. § 2(2). For information on the
application process and the makeup of the Gender Recognition panel, see generally Gender
Recognition Panel, http://www.grp.gov.uk (last visited Sept. 22, 2006).
219 Private sports associations are exempted. Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, § 19
(U.K.). Similarly, members of the clergy with sincere religious objections are not required to
marry couples where one spouse is transsexual. Id. § 11, sched. 4. Both of these provisions
were subject to extended discussion. See, e.g., LIBRARY OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS,
RESEARCH PAPER No. 04/15, THE GENDER RECOGNITION BILL 24, 45, 52 (2004), http://
www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2004/rpO4-015.pdf (summarizing Lords de-
bate).
220 See Id. §22.
221 418 PARE. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 53 (statement of Mr. David Lammy, Parliamen-
tary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs).
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years to receive surgeries.222 This position was taken from the time the Bill
was first introduced, and--despite its relative novelty-seems to have been
questioned only by those who opposed the entire Bill on principle. An
amendment in the House of Lords which would have required surgery was
quickly withdrawn after peers called it "wrong '' 223 and "quite unnecessarily
cruel. 224 They noted the risks of surgery, and that certain medical condi-
tions could increase those risks. And while a committee report indicated
concerns that "the Draft Bill, by extending beyond post-operative trans-
sexuals... comes perilously close to giving legal recognition to a lifestyle
choice, 225 no one ever proposed distinguishing between those who could
not obtain surgery for the financial and medical reasons urged by Govern-
ment ministers and those who merely made "a lifestyle choice." 2
26
The Government also made clear that, while applicants for gender
recognition must "intend[] to continue to live in the acquired gender until
death . .. ,227 the law does not contemplate legal transition as irreversible,
and it is possible for individuals to go through the process more than once.
Despite the emphasis placed on irreversibility in other countries, there were
no suggestions in Parliament to make the process irreversible. There was,
however, debate over amendments-ultimately withdrawn-which would
have made returning to one's birth sex easer than the initial transition, by
permitting the revocation on demand of a gender recognition certificate. In
the House of Commons, the bill's sponsor noted that the number of people
who reverse their gender transition is very small, and argued that in any
case, "the criteria in the Bill for changing gender should apply equally to a
222 JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, NINETEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 2002-03 (DRAFT
GENDER RECOGNITION BILL), 2002-3, H.L. 188-I, H.C. 1276-1, at 13, available at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt200203/tselect/jtrights/1 88/188.pdf.
223 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 375 (statement of Lord Filkin, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs).
224 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 371 (remarks of Lord Tumberg).
225 JOINT COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 224.
226 The absence of any absolute requirement of hormone therapy was never discussed. It is
worth considering whether the relative absence of controversy over the Bill, and over the
absence of a surgery requirement in particular, owed anything to Members' acceptance of
arguably erroneous facts. Backers of the Bill often stated that "[s]uch people who do not
have surgery are few." 656 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 375 (remarks of Lord Filkin).
The Bill's leading opponent, on the other hand, contended that "some 50 per cent" never
have SRS. 655 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 1311 (remarks of Baroness O'Cathain).
Similarly, proponents frequently pointed out that the Bill dealt with very small group of
people numbering no more than 5,000. But, as noted above, that number may represent a
serious undercount. See discussion supra note 13. Might Members have voted differently had
they believe there were as many as 15,000 or 20,000 transsexuals in the country, and that a
great many of them had not had and would not have surgery? See also SHARPE, supra note
69, at 184-85 (discussing these issues in the context of law reform in Western Australia).
227 Gender Recognition Act, 2004, c. 7, §2(l)(c) (U.K.) (emphasis added).
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person who seeks recognition in the acquired gender and to a person who
wishes to return to being recognized in the birth gender.,
228
While it does not mandate irreversibility, however, the law is
unlikely to permit the "switching back and forth" that some have feared. An
amendment in the House of Lords to limit persons to two changes of gender
status was withdrawn after the bill's sponsor suggested it was virtually re-
dundant. "I cannot conceive of a situation where a panel would be open to
persuasion," he said, that an individual who had transitioned twice before
genuinely intended to live in the once-again-acquired gender until death.229
Another striking feature of the Bill, emphasized by Government
ministers and other Bill supporters, is that "[t]he individual is in control of
the process" of gender recognition.23° In response to concerns that individu-
als would be forced to divorce, or to forego pension rights, by virtue of their
change of legal status-concerns which consumed the bulk of debate on the
Bill-supporters echoed again and again the concept of "informed
choice.",231 Transsexual persons "do not have to go all the way to gender
recognition; they can live the life and have the surgery without necessarily
applying for the gender recognition certificate. 232 This means that an indi-
vidual and her spouse would remain legally members of the opposite sex,
despite appearing to the entire world as a same-sex couple.
C. The Best Available Option
Under the GRA sex is no longer a fact to be assessed by courts of
law, but is an administrative status that changes only through an administra-
tive process. 233 Courts will no longer look to individuals' actual sex charac-
teristics, but to their birth certificate, which will reflect whether they have
gone through that process. Thus, married couples can be either of the same
228 418 PAR. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2004) 18 (remarks of Mr. David Lammy, Parliamen-
tary Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs).
229 657 PARE. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 379 (statement of Lord Filkin, Parliamentary
Under-Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs).
230 656 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) GC132 (remarks of Lord Evans of Temple Guit-
ing).
231 656 PARL. DEB., H.L. t5th ser.) (2004) GC94 (remarks of Baroness Hollis of Heigham,
Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions).
232 Id. at GC96.
233 This is apparently the case in some of the United States as well, except that in the ab-
sence of a special panel for transsexual persons, individuals must apply directly to the vital
statistics bureau. See, e.g., HAw. REV. STAT. § 338-17.7(a)(4) (2006) (sex change established
by submitting affidavit by physician to registrar); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-1 18 (2006). But
see infra, note 96 (birth certificate not always decisive).
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birth sex, or of the same social sex-or, potentially, both234-- so long as
they are not of the same legal sex. In this sense, legal sex under the GRA
was aptly described by one Member of Parliament as simply a "bit of pa-
per. ' 2
35
Nevertheless, this "bit of paper" controls individuals' legal rights
and responsibilities. Transsexual individuals have a unique freedom under
the GRA to choose their legal gender irrespective of their actual gender.
But while individuals need not choose surgery to obtain recognition, the
GRA's scheme carries with it the necessity of making other potentially
painful choices. For example, some are forced to choose between a birth
certificate that reflects who they are, and remaining in a valid marriage, or
obtaining a public pension.
Additionally, replacing the false assurance of a "bright-line" surgi-
cal requirement2 36 with the vague standard of "living in the acquired gen-
der" carries certain risks. Reliance on illegitimate stereotypes about how
men and women "live" could result in inequitable decisions. While the ex-
pert composition of the Gender Recognition Panel may minimize this dan-
ger, inquiries into whether an individual is "living in the acquired gender"
also have the potential to be quite intrusive.237
By eschewing a requirement of surgery, or any test of "true sex,"
the GRA, (in the words of one of its staunchest opponents,) "abandons ab-
solute beliefs about sex and gender. 238 Having gone this far, and in light of
the continuing difficulties posed for trans people by legal distinctions be-
tween men and women, there might seem to be little purpose in retaining
such legal distinctions at all. Legal distinctions between racial groups were
once pervasive in American law, but have since been universally rejected as
234 This would be the case where an individual obtained a gender recognition certificate,
married, and subsequently returned to living in her birth sex, but decided to forego legal
recognition.
235 HOUSE OF COMM ONS STANDING COMMITTEE A, GENDER RECOGNITION BILL, 2004, H.C.
083, available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200304/cmstand/a/st040311/
am/403 1 s02.htm (remarks of Mr. Shaun Woodward). Mr. Woodward aptly described the
situation thus created as "a ludicrous pickle." Id. at 084. In semiotic terms, legal sex under
the GRA verges on the "radical disconnection between signifier and signified..." that char-
acterizes the "empty signifier." DANIEL CHANDLER, SEMIOTICS: THE BASICS 74 (2002).
236 See infra notes 111-28 and accompanying text.
237 Such inquiries, and the kinds of evidence they are likely to rely upon, also bear an un-
settling resemblance to nineteenth-century American trials in which courts looked to the
testimony of neighbors and associates to determine a person's racial identity. See generally
Ariela J. Gross, Litigating Whiteness: Trials of Racial Determination in the Nineteenth-
Century South, 108 YALE L.J. 109, 147-51 (1998) (surveying cases in which courts heard
testimony about a person's social company to determine his or her race).
238 657 PARL. DEB., H.L. (5th ser.) (2004) 360 (remarks of Baroness O'Cathain).
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unconscionable and unconstitutional.239 The number of areas in which legal
sex distinctions are made is also in decline, in Britain as elsewhere. 240 Nev-
ertheless, serious political barriers241 and some significant policy con-
cerns-for example, the areas of prison security and antidiscrimination
law242-make the wholesale abolition of legal sex distinctions an unlikely
prospect at the present time. In this context, the GRA represents the most
fair and sensible legal approach to gender recognition yet seen.
V. CONCLUSION
Recent developments in a variety of jurisdictions evidence a strong
international trend toward gender recognition for some transsexual people.
But while gender recognition for some is increasingly recognized as sound
social policy, and (at least in Europe) as an important human right, trans
men and women who have not undergone sex reassignment surgery are al-
most uniformly denied this right. Large numbers of trans people live with-
out such surgery due to medical conditions, financial constraints, fear of
complications, religious beliefs, or simply by personal choice. Attempts to
justify the denial of gender recognition to these individuals reveal misuse of
medical science, baseless fears, and irrational prejudice. Despite increasing
respect by courts and legislatures for the human rights of transsexual peo-
ple-not least the right to gender recognition-surgical requirements com-
promise their rights to equal treatment, bodily integrity, and religious obser-
vance.
The vague and often conclusory explanations given by courts and
commentators for the surgical requirement suggest that it is based on faulty
assumptions more than on careful consideration. Rather than having consid-
ered and rejected them, decision-makers appear unaware of the compelling
239 On the history of race distinctions, see PAULI MURRAY, STATES' LAWS ON RACE AND
COLOR 14-20, 705 tbl.3 (1950) (summarizing then-current segregation laws); GILBERT T.
STEPHENSON, RACE DISTINCTIONS IN AMERICAN LAW 26-322 (1910); IAN HANEY L6PEZ,
WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 49-92 (1996) (summarizing history of
race-based immigration restrictions).
240 See, e.g., Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (ser. A) 149 (1981) (invalidat-
ing sex-based sodomy statute); Sexual Offences Act, 2003, c. 42 (U.K.) (sex-neutral rape
statute); Pensions Act, 1995, c. 26, §126 (U.K.) (eliminating sex-based pension eligibility by
2020).
241 Although a recent act has eliminated sex-based partnership rights in all but name, sig-
nificant public opposition to sex-neutral civil marriage persists. Civil Partnerships Act, 2004,
c. 33 (U.K.).
242 As in the United States, the Equal Pay Act, 1970, c.41 (U.K.), as well as the Genuine
Occupational Qualification defense to employment discrimination suits, Sex Discrimination
Act, 1975, c. 65, §7 (U.K.), both rely on explicit sex distinctions. Eliminating these distinc-
tions while still serving the statutes' purposes would pose significant, though perhaps not
insurmountable, difficulties.
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reasons why many transsexual individuals cannot have SRS, choose not to
have it, or must delay it for many years. Moreover, they have been strongly
influenced by the outdated notion that only SRS can confirm the authentic-
ity and permanence of gender transition. In other words, "there are no sig-
nificant factors of public interest to weigh against the interest of [the] indi-
vidual applicant in obtaining legal recognition of her gender re-assignment,"
regardless of whether he or she has had such surgery.243
The United Kingdom's Gender Recognition Act represents a clear
and deliberate break from jurisdictions requiring surgery. In the first two
years of its operation, the Gender Recognition Panel processed over nine
hundred applications, of which about two percent were rejected.2" As this
process continues and ill social effects fail to materialize, the GRA will
stand as an example for other nations that surgical requirements are not only
cruel but unnecessary.
POSTSCRIPT
As of this writing, the Spanish government is poised to pass a bill
that, like the GRA, would enable gender recognition without surgery.245 As
in the UK, the bill would require that applicants have lived in their authentic
gender for at least two years.246 Since same-sex marriage is recognized in
Spain, eligibility to marry is a non-issue. This fact will no doubt ease the
passage of this bill and perhaps prompt the passage of others like it in juris-
dictions embracing same-sex marriage.
243 Goodwin v. United Kingdom, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1, 32.
244 440 PARL. DEB., H.C. (6th ser.) (2005) 2549W. Another 240 applications had been
received but not processed. Id. The rate of applications will naturally begin to decrease after
the first year, as the system is currently facing a "backlog" of people who would have ap-
plied for gender recognition years ago had it been available.
245 BOCG, Senado, 2006, 79(a) (Spain) (as transmitted to Senate on 28 November 2006),
earlier draft available in English at http://www.pfc.org.uk/PL transsexualPSOE.pdf.
246 Cabinet Backs Legal Status for Transsexuals' New Gender, EL PALS, June 3, 2006, at
1, available at 2006 WL 9509889. In contrast to the GRA, it appears the Spanish bill will not
affect pension eligibility. Id.
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